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If [a landlord] chose to stand on his right, the tenants must be taught, by
the strong arm of the law, that they had no power to oppose or resist ...
[Piroperty would be valueless and capital would no longer be invested in
cultivation of the land if it were not acknowledged that it was the landlord's
undoubted, indefeasible, and most sacred right to deal with his property as
he list.
-Henry Lord Brougham, defending the right of English landlords to evict
Irish tenants due to non-payment of rent during the potato famine in Ireland.
Speech in the House of Lords, March 23, 1846.
I. Introduction
In recent years, the law concerning the landlord-tenant relation-
ship has changed radically.' Legislation aimed at improving the
position of the tenants has become common. Tenants have won the
statutory right to obtain delivery of possession at the beginning of
their terms, to sublease or assign, to imply a warranty of habitabil-
ity, to hold landlords liable for injuries caused by their negligence,
and even to procure a lease written in plain English.'
Most recently, tenants have been given another weapon to use
against overreaching landlords-the right to petition a court to de-
clare a lease or any of its clauses unconscionable and, hence, un-
enforceable.' New York's Real Property Law 235-c became effec-
tive July 26, 1976 and applies to all leases, regardless of when they
were executed.4 The statute reads: '
1. If the court as a matter of law finds a lease or any clause of the lease to
have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to
enforce the lease, or it may enforce the remainder of the lease without the
unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscion-
able clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
2. When it is claimed or appears to the court that a lease or any clause
thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a reasonable
opportunity to present evidence as to its setting, purpose and effect to aid
the court in making the determination.
The New York statute is similar to section 1.303 of the Uniform
1. See text accompanying notes 43-48 infra.
2. N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW §§ 223-a, 226-b & 235-b (McKinney 1968 & Supp. 1978); N.Y.
GEN. OBLIG. LAW §§ 5-321 & 5-702 (McKinney 1978 & Supp. 1978).
3. N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 235-c (McKinney Supp. 1978).
4. 1976 N.Y. Laws, ch. 828, § 2.
5. N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 235-c (McKinney Supp. 1978).
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Residential Landlord and Tenant Act' (URLTA) which has been
adopted by several states.7 A major difference between the two stat-
utes is that the URLTA provision applies only to leases of residen-
tial premises8 while section 235-c has no such restriction.,
Section 235-c codified a common law theory of leasehold uncon-
scionability which the New York courts had been evolving since
1970.10 One court noted that "the power of Judges to declare unen-
6. UNIFORM RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD & TENANT Acr § 1.303 [hereinafter cited as URLTAI,
which reads:
(a) If the court, as a matter of law, finds
(1) a rental agreement or any provision thereof was unconscionable when
made, the court may refuse to enforce the agreement, enforce the remainder of
the agreement without the unconscionable provision, or limit the application of
any unconscionable provision to avoid an unconscionable result; or
(2) a settlement in which a party waives or agrees to forego a claim or right
under this Act or under a rental agreement was unconscionable when made, the
court may refuse to enforce the settlement, enforce the remainder of the settle-
ment without the unconscionable provision, or limit the application of any
unconscionable provision to avoid an unconscionable result.
(b) If unconscionability is put into issue by a party or by the court upon its own
motion the parties shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present evidence as
to the setting, purpose, and effect of the rental agreement or settlement to aid the court
in making the determination.
Id.
The URLTA was approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws in 1972. For a discussion of the Act, see Subcommittee on the Model Landlord-
Tenant Act of Committee on Leases, Proposed Uniform Residential Landlord & Tenant Act,
8 REAL PROP., PROS. & TR. J. 104 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Proposed URLTAI; Strum,
Proposed Uniform Residential Landlord & Tenant Act: A Departure from Traditional Con-
cepts, 8 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 495 (1973).
7. See ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 33-1312 (1974); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 83.45 (West Supp. 1978);
HAW. REv. STAT. § 521-75 (1976); 1978 Iowa Laws 501; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-2544 (Weeks
1976); Ky. REy. STAT. ANN. § 383.555 (Supp. 1978); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. 42-411 (Supp.
1977); NEB. REv. STAT. § 76-1412 (1976); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 70-7-12 (Supp. 1975); OHIO REv.
CODE ANN. § 5321.14 (Page Supp. 1978); OR. REv. STAT. § 91.735 (1977); TENN. CODE ANN. §
64-2814 (1976).
Alaska and Virginia, which have adopted portions of the URLTA, did not adopt section
1.303.
8. URLTA § 1.201.
9. When the New York statute was first introduced as a bill, it applied only to "a lease
of a residential unit." Senate Bill 253/Assembly Bill 272 (Jan. 8, 1975). This limitation was
deleted in committee.
10. See, e.g., Tai on Luck Corp. v. Cirota, 35 A.D.2d 380, 316 N.Y.S.2d 438 (1st Dep't
1970), appeal dismissed, 29 N.Y.2d 747, motion for reconsideration of dismissal denied, 29
N.Y.2d 868 (1971); 57 E. 54 Realty Corp. v. Gay Nineties Realty Corp., 71 Misc. 2d 353, 335
N.Y.S.2d 872 (App. T. 1st Dep't 1972), leave to appeal denied, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 18, 1972, at 2,
col. 1 (A.D. 1st Dep't); Seabrook v. Commuter Hous. Co., 72 Misc. 2d 6, 338 N.Y.S.2d 67
(Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1972), aff'd on other grounds per curiam, 79 Misc. 2d 168, 363 N.Y. S.2d 566
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forceable unconscionable clauses will increasingly prove to be a con-
structive remedial device against the more flagrant excesses. . . in
our complex society. . . ."" Some of the pre-section 235-c decisions
cited the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) provision on uncon-
scionability as authority for refusing to enforce certain lease
clauses." Others relied on the court's equity powers." One court
relied on New York City's Consumer Protection Law. 4
However they substantiated their decisions, the lower New York
courts were not hesitating to engraft the doctrine of unconsciona-
bility into the law of landlord-tenant. Nevertheless, a need for statu-
(App. T. 2d Dep't 1973); Steinberg v. Carreras, 74 Misc. 2d 32, 344 N.Y.S.2d 136 (Civ. Ct.
N.Y. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 77 Misc. 2d 774, 357 N.Y.S.2d 369 (App. T. 1st Dep't
1974); SKD Enterprises, Inc. v. L & M Offset, Inc., 65 Misc. 2d 612, 318 N.Y.S.2d 539 (Civ.
Ct. N.Y. 1971).
11. SKD Enterprises, Inc. v. L & M Offset Inc., 65 Misc. 2d 612, 615-16, 318 N.Y.S.2d
539, 543 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1971).
12. Seabrook v. Commuter Hous. Co., 72 Misc. 2d 6, 8-9, 338 N.Y.S.2d 67, 70-71 (Civ.
Ct. N.Y. 1972); SKD Enterprises, Inc. v. L & M Offset, Inc., 65 Misc. 2d 612, 615, 318
N.Y.S.2d 539, 543 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1971).
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302 [hereinafter cited as U.C.C.] reads:
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to
have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce the
contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable
clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any
unconscionable result.
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any clause thereof
may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to pres-
ent evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose and effect to aid the court in making
the determination.
Id.
13. 57 E. 54 Realty Corp. v. Gay Nineties Realty Corp., 71 Misc. 2d 353, 354, 335 N.Y.S.2d
872, 873 (App. T. 1st Dep't 1972); Weidman v. Tomaselli, 81 Misc. 2d 328, 334-35, 365
N.Y.S.2d 681, 689-90 (Rockland County Ct.), aff'd mem., 84 Misc. 2d 782, 386 N.Y.S.2d 276
(App. T. 2d Dep't 1975). The trial court in Weidman specifically stated that U.C.C. § 2-302
was inapplicable to leases of real property. 81 Misc. 2d at 334, 365 N.Y.S.2d at 689.
In its report on the URLTA, the American Bar Association Subcommittee on the Model
Landlord-Tenant Act of Committee on Leases concluded that URLTA § 1.303 "is merely a
codification of the powers an equity court has always possessed." Proposed URLTA, supra
note 6, at 107 n.13. See Berger, Hard Leases Make Bad Law, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 791, 811 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Berger].
14. Yengel v. Martiniez, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 9, 1975, at 21, col. 4 (Civ. Ct. N.Y.). For similar
decisions, see Love v. Pressley, 34 N.C. App. 503, 239 S.E.2d 574 (1977); Commonwealth v.
Monumental Properties, Inc., 459 Pa. 450, 329 A.2d 812 (1974).
New York City's Consumer Protection Law reads: "No person shall engage in any decep-
tive or unconscionable trade practice in the sale, lease, rental or loan or in the offering for
sale, lease, rental, or loan of any consumer goods or services, or in the collection of consumer
debts." NEW YORK, N.Y. ADMIN. CODE ch. 64, tit. A, § 2203d-1.0.
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tory authorization was seen." The New York Court of Appeals had
never considered the theory of leasehold unconscionability'" and the
appellate departments apparently were split. 7 Therefore, the legis-
lature enacted section 235-c, codifying what many courts already
had recognized.
This Comment shall explore the principle of unconscionability as
it applies to leases of real property, outline the types of lease clauses
which have been held unconscionable to date, set forth other areas
where the courts may apply the theory of leasehold unconsciona-
bility, and point out several issues which courts must face in
construing section 235-c. It must be made clear, however, that there
is very little authoritative case law in the area of leasehold uncon-
scionability. The New York appellate courts, with a few exceptions,
have not considered the issue. Nor has there been much judicial
consideration of the URLTA provision.
15. Memorandum of Assemblyman Edward H. Lehner, NEW YORK STATE LEGISLATIVE
ANNUAL 286 (1976).
16. The court of appeals dismissed an appeal from Tai on Luck Corp. v. Cirota, 35
A.D.2d 380, 316 N.Y.S.2d 438 (1st Dep't 1970), because the appellant had requested a stipula-
tion for judgment absolute from the appellate division. 29 N.Y.2d 747, motion for reconsidera-
tion of dismissal denied, 29 N.Y.2d 868 (1971).
17. The first department did not question the right of a court to declare unconscionable
a lease provision. See George Backer Mgt. Corp. v. Acme Quilting Co., 55 A.D.2d 535, 389
N.Y.S.2d 111 (1st Dep't 1976), appeal dismissed, 40 N.Y.2d 1092 (1977); New York Merchan-
dise Co. v. 23rd Street Properties, 49 A.D.2d 849, 373 N.Y.S.2d 867 (1st Dep't) (mem.),
motion for leave to appeal denied, 38 N.Y.2d 707 (1975); Tai on Luck Corp. v. Cirota, 35
A.D.2d 380, 316 N.Y.S.2d 438 (1st Dep't 1970), appeal dismissed, 29 N.Y.2d 747, motion for
reconsideration of dismissal denied, 29 N.Y.2d 868 (1971); 57 E. 54 Realty Corp. v. Gay
Nineties Realty Corp., 71 Misc. 2d 353, 335 N.Y.S.2d 872 (App. T. 1st Dep't 1972), leave to
appeal denied, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 18, 1971, at 2, col. 1 (A.D. 1st Dep't).
The second department was more hesitant in holding lease provisions unconscionable. See
Rodriguez v. Nachamie, 57 A.D.2d 920, 395 N.Y.S.2d 51 (2d Dep't 1977) (mem.); Seabrook
v. Commuter Hous. Co., 79 Misc. 2d 168; 363 N.Y.S.2d 566 (App. T. 2d Dep't 1973), aff'g 72
Misc. 2d 6, 338 N.Y.S.2d 67 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1972). But see Weidman v. Tomaselli, 84 Misc.
2d 782, 386 N.Y.S.2d 276 (App. T. 2d Dep't) (mem.), aff'g 81 Misc. 2d 328, 365 N.Y.S.2d
681 (Rockland County Ct. 1975). The second department has been equally hesitant even after
passage of section 235-c. See Lefrak v. Lambert, 93 Misc. 2d 632, 403 N.Y.S.2d 397 (App. T.
2d Dep't 1978) (per curiam), modifying 89 Misc. 2d 197, 390 N.Y.S.2d 959 (Civ. Ct. N.Y.
1976); Pine Hill Assocs. v. Malveaux, 93 Misc. 2d 63, 403 N.Y.S.2d 398 (App. T. 2d Dep't
1978), revg 89 Misc. 2d 234, 391 N.Y.S.2d 58 (Yonkers City Ct. 1977). See also decisions of
the second department considering U.C.C. § 2-302: David v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust
Co., 59 Misc. 2d 248, 298 N.Y.S.2d 847 (App. T. 2d Dep't 1969) (per curiam), rev'g 55 Misc.
2d 1080, 287 N.Y.S.2d 565 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1968); Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso, 54 Misc. 2d
119, 281 N.Y.S.2d 964 (App. T. 2d Dep't 1967) (per curiam), rev'g 52 Misc. 2d 26, 274
N.Y.S.2d 757 (Nassau Dist. Ct. 1966).
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II. The Theory of Unconscionability
The principle that unconscionable agreements will not be en-
forced is an ancient one. 8 Roman law allowed for the recission of
contracts due to the inadequacy of the price. 9 During the Middle
Ages, legal scholars and theologians developed a theory whereby
exaction of unjust prices was forbidden. 0 The French Civil Code
gave courts the power to nullify contracts on grounds of unconscion-
ability.2'
As early as 1750, an unconscionable bargain was recognized as a
form of fraud by an English court.22 In 1870, the United States
Supreme Court carried the principle one step further and held that,
even absent a showing of fraud, an unconscionable contract was
unenforceable at equity.23 While courts of equity refused to enforce
unconscionable agreements, courts of law did not create a rule
against unconscionability nor did they bar a common law action to
enforce an unconscionable agreement.
The U.C.C. empowered courts, as a matter of law, to determine
whether a contract or a clause in a contract is unconscionable. The
Official Comment to the Code's unconscionability provision indi-
cates that case law inspired the provision. Thus, while section 2-
302 of the U.C.C. can serve as an aid in deciding leasehold uncon-
scionability cases, it should be remembered that the Code is not the
only source of the doctrine of unconscionability.27
None of the unconscionability statutes define an unconscionable
agreement. 8 The fact that the U.C.C. does not define unconsciona-
18. Comment, Unconscionable Contract Provisions: A History of Unenforceability from
Roman Law to the UCC, 42 TULANE L. REv. 193 (1967).
19. CODE 4.44.2.
20. Comment, Unconscionable Contract Provisions: A History of Unenforceability from
Roman Law to the UCC. 42 TULANE L. REv. 193, 194 (1967).
21. C. CIV. arts. 1131 & 1133.
22. Earl of Chesterfield v. Janssen, 28 Eng. Rep. 82, 100 (Ch. 1750). See 1 J. STORY, EQurry
JURISPRUDENCE § 188 (13th ed. 1886).
23. Scott v. United States, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 443, 445 (1870).
24. 1 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 128 (1963).
25. U.C.C. §2-302. See note 12 supra.
.26. U.C.C. § 2-302, Comment 1.
27. Berger, supra note 13, at 811.
28. Of the states that have adopted the URLTA, only Kentucky has defined
"unconscionable": "an act or conduct which is wilful and is so harsh and unjust as would be
condemned or considered to be wrongful and would be shocking to the conscience of honest
and fair-minded people." Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 383.545(16) (Supp. 1978).
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bility has been called the "greatest strength" of the doctrine of
unconscionability. 9 The New York legislature never intended to
define unconscionability since to do so would limit its application.3 0
Several courts have attempted to define an unconscionable agree-
ment. The classic definition, formulated by Lord Hardwicke in Earl
of Chesterfield v. Janssen,' is a bargain "such as no man in his
senses and not under delusion would make on the one hand, and as
no honest and fair man would accept on the other .... *"32 In one
of the first decisions to consider U.C.C. section 2-302, the court
stated that "[uinconscionability has generally been recognized to
include an absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the
parties together with contract terms which are unreasonably favora-
ble to the other party. '33 The Restatement of the Law of Property
URLTA § 1.403, however, sets forth certain prohibited lease provisions:
(a) A rental agreement may not provide that the tenant:
(1) agrees to waive or forego rights or remedies under this Act;
(2) authorizes any person to confess judgment on a claim arising out of the
rental agreement;
(3) agrees to pay the landlord's attorney's fees; or
(4) agrees to the exculpation or limitation of any liability of the landlord
arising under law or to indemnify the landlord for that liability or the costs
connected therewith.
(b) A provision prohibited by subsection (a) included in a rental agreement is unen-
forceable. If a landlord deliberately uses a rental agreement containing provisions
known by him to be prohibited, the tenant may recover in addition to his actual
damages an amount up to [3] months' periodic rent and reasonable attorney's fees.
Id.
29. Boyd, Representing Consumers-The Uniform Commercial Code and Beyond, 9 ARIz.
L. REv. 372, 383 (1968); T. QUINN, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE COMMENTARY AND LAW DIGEST
§ 2-302(A)(1)(1978); But see Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New
Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 487-88 (1967); King, Suggested Changes to the Uniform
Commercial Code-Sales, 33 ORE. L. REv. 113, 115 (1954) in which the authors suggest that
the failure of the Code to define unconscionability is a weakness, not a strength. California
refused to enact section 2-302 when it adopted the Code because it was felt giving such power
to courts without a workable definition of unconscionability would have an adverse effect on
commercial activity. California State Bar Committee on the Commercial Code, The Uniform
Commercial Code, 37 CAUF. ST. B. J. 119, 135-36 (1962).
30. Nu Dimensions Figure Salons v. Becerra, 73 Misc. 2d 140, 143, 340 N.Y.S.2d 268, 272
(Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1973).
31. 28 Eng. Rep. 82 (Ch. 1750).
32. Id. at 100. See Hume v. United States, 132 U.S. 406, 411 (1889); Greer v. Tweed, 13
Abb. Pr. (n.s.) 427, 429 (C.P. 1872); 1 J. STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 188 (13th ed. 1886);
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1694 (4th rev. ed. 1968).
33. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445; 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965). Be-
cause the case was decided prior to the effective date of the U.C.C. in the District of Colum-
bia, the decision was based on common law but the court noted that it was taking U.C.C.
section 2-302 into consideration. Id. at 448-49.
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defines an unconscionable agreement as one which "would shock
the conscience if enforced." 4
The Official Comment to the URLTA states that the test a court
should apply in deciding if a clause in a lease is unconscionable is
"whether, in light of the background and settling of the market, the
conditions of the particular parties to the rental agreements. . . are
so one-sided as to be unconscionable under the circumstances exist-
ing at the time of the making of the agreement. . . . "3 The Official
Comment to the U.C.C. provides for a similar test.3 ' Thus, both
comments set forth an 'unconscionable' standard as a test for deter-
mining unconscionability. Since none of the unconscionability stat-
utes even attempt to define unconscionability, courts will have to
look elsewhere, for example, to industry standards or societal norms,
to determine whether a lease is unconscionable.37
III. The Lease as a Contract
Oliver Wendell Holmes once stated that "the law as to leases is
not a matter of logic in vacuo; it is a matter of history that has not
forgotten Lord Coke."3 The law of leaseholds, however, has changed
significantly in recent years. One of the most important changes is
the developing treatment of a lease as a contract rather than a
conveyance. This fundamental change paved the way for courts and
34. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 5.6, Comment e (1977). The Restatement lists
the following factors to be considered in determining whether an agreement in a lease is
unconscionable: (1) whether it is counter to the policy underlying statutory or regulatory
provisions, (2) whether it appears in a lease of commercial or residential property, (3) whether
it serves a reasonable business purpose and appears to be the result of conscious negotiations,
(4) whether it appears to be part of an unduly harsh and unreasonable standard, "boiler-
plate" lease document, (5) whether either party habitually disregards it in actual operation
under the lease or, in the case of the landlord, under similar leases, (6) whether it imposes
unconscionable burdens on persons financially ill-equipped to assume them and who may
have had significant inequality of bargaining power, and (7) whether the parties were each
represented by counsel in the course of negotiating the lease. Id. See also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 234, comment d (Tent. Draft Nos. 1-7, 1972).
Other definitions of unconscionability include: "if one party has the power of saying to the
other 'That which you require shall not be done except upon the conditions which I choose
to impose'...." Morgan v. Palmer, 107 Eng. Rep. 554, 556 (K.B. 1824); "'an inequality so
strong, gross and manifest, that it is impossible to state it to a man of common sense without
producing an exclamation of the inequality of it.'" Stiefler v. McCullough, 97 Ind. App. 123,
130, 174 N.E. 823, 826 (1931).
35. URLTA § 1.303, Comment (emphasis added).
36. U.C.C. § 2-302, Comment 1. See 1 A. CoRaIN, CONTRAcTs § 128 (1963).
37. See Berger, supra note 13, at 812.
38. Gardiner v. William S. Butler & Co., 245 U.S. 603, 605 (1918).
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legislatures to apply the contractual principle of unconscionability
to leases.
At common law originally, tenants' rights were purely contractual
in nature.3" During the feudal age, however, a tenant had a posses-
sory interest in the leasehold, with the land itself as the principal
element of a lease.4 Thus, leases were thought of less as contracts
and more as conveyances." Accordingly, the concept arose that the
rent, the consideration for the lease, issued out of the land itself and,
so long as the tenant had possession of the land, the consideration
would not fail.4"
So the law remained for hundreds of years. Landlord-tenant law
was based on a single notion-the possession-rent relationship.43
During the past decade, however, this notion has been destroyed.
Courts and legislatures realized that equity required the revision of
traditional landlord-tenant law." Contract principles gradually
were injected into leases by means of court decisions, federal and
state statutes, and local ordinances. 5 Mutual dependency of lease
covenants,4" implied warranties,47 and mitigation of damages" are
examples of these contractual principles.
Today, a lease of real property is considered a contract.49 The pre-
39. 2 F. POLOCK & F. MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I
106-07 (2d ed. 1923); 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.11 (1952).
40. Hicks, The Contractual Nature of Real Property Leases, 24 BAYLOR L. REV. 443, 450
(1972) [hereinafter cited as Hicks]. See Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071,
1074 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970).
41. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.11 (1952); 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *318; 1
H. TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 74 (3d ed. 1939); Friedman, The Nature of a Lease
in New York, 33 CORNELL L. REv. 165, 166 (1947). See Becker v. Manufacturers Trust Co.,
262 A.D. 525, 527, 30 N.Y.S.2d 542, 544 motion for reargument denied, 263 A.D. 810, 32
N.Y.S.2d 126 (1st Dep't 1941).
42. Hicks, supra note 40, at 450.
43. Quinn & Phillips, The Law of Landlord-Tenant: A Critical Evaluation of the Past
with Guidelines for the Future, 38 FORDHAM L. REv. 225, 228 (1969).
44. Gallet, The Evolution of Landlord-Tenant Law, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 13, 1976, at 1, col. 1.
45. Hicks, supra note 40, at 446 (1972); 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.11 (1952). For a
discussion indicating that recent innovations in landlord-tenant law have exceeded even
contract law, see Donahue, Change in the American Law of Landlord and Tenant, 37 MODERN
L. REV. 242 (1974).
46. Lefrak v. Lambert, 89 Misc. 2d 197, 202, 390 N.Y.S.2d 959, 963 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1976).
47. See text accompanying notes 111 & 112 infra.
48. See text accompanying notes 214-18 infra.
49. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1075 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Geraci v.
Jenrette, 41 N.Y.2d 660, 665, 363 N.E.2d 559, 563, 394 N.Y.S.2d 853, 856 (1977). See Hicks,
supra note 40; Note, Contract Principles and Leases of Realty, 50 B.U. L. REV. 24 (1970).
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section 235-c decisions involving unconscionability stated this in
their reasoning.50 The legislature, in passing section 235-c, viewed
the lease as a contract.' Similarly, the URLTA rejects the convey-
ance theory of leases and looks to contract law for regulating the
landlord-tenant relationship. 2
Having removed leaseholds from the exclusive realm of real prop-
erty, courts now recognize that the land itself is not at the heart of
a modem leasehold. In addition to physical space, tenants contract
for the landlords' services as well. 53 As one court observed:5"
[In the case of the modem apartment dweller, the value of the lease is that
it gives him a place to live. The city dweller who seeks to lease an apartment
on the third floor of a tenement has little interest in the land 30 or 40 feet
below, or even in the bare right to possession within the four walls of his
apartment. When American city dwellers, both rich and poor, seek "shelter"
today, they seek a well known package of goods and services-a package
which includes not merely walls and ceilings, but also adequate heat, light
and ventilation, serviceable plumbing facilities, secure windows and doors,
proper sanitation, and proper maintenance.
Since a lease is no longer perceived as a conveyance, it follows
that a landlord is no longer a grantor. Several courts have held him
to be a merchant.55 As they looked to the U.C.C. for a theory of
unconscionability,5 so too did the courts look to the Code for a
definition of "merchant."5 The U.C.C. defines "merchant" as a
50. See 57 E. 54 Realty Corp. v. Gay Nineties Realty Corp., 71 Misc. 2d 353, 355, 335
N.Y.S.2d 872, 873-74 (App. T. 1st Dep't 1972); Avenue Assocs. v. Buxbaum, 83 Misc. 2d 134,
139, 371 N.Y.S.2d 736, 742 (Civ. Ct. N.Y.), rev'd per curiam, 83 Misc. 2d 719, 373 N.Y.S.2d
814 (App. T. 1st Dep't 1975); Kips Bay Towers, Inc. v. Armstrong, 82 Misc. 2d 489, 492, 368
N.Y.S.2d 417, 420 (Civ. Ct. N.Y.), aff'd per curiam, 85 Misc. 2d 342, 378 N.Y.S.2d 652 (App.
T. 1st Dep't 1975).
51. Lefrak v. Lambert, 89 Misc. 2d 197, 202, 390 N.Y.S.2d 959, 963 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1976).
52. Proposed URLTA, supra note 6, at 105.
53. 57 E. 54 Realty Corp. v. Gay Nineties Realty Corp., 71 Misc. 2d 353, 355, 335 N.Y.S.2d
872, 874 (App. T. 1st Dep't 1972); Douglas Manor House, Inc. v. Wohlfeld, 66 Misc. 2d 265,
267, 322 N.Y.S.2d 135, 137 (App. T. 1st Dep't 1970)(dissenting opinion).
54. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1074 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
55. See id. at 1079; Yengel v. Martinez, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 9, 1975, at 21, col. 3 (Civ. Ct. N.Y.);
Seabrook v. Commuter Hous. Co., 72 Misc. 2d 6, 8, 338 N.Y.S.2d 67, 69 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1972).
See Quinn & Phillips, The Law of Landlord-Tenant: A Critical Evaluation of the Past with
Guidelines for the Future, 38 FORDHAM L. REv. 225, 254 (1969).
56. See text accompanying note 12 supra.
57. Yengel v. Martinez, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 9, 1975, at 21, col. 3 (Civ. Ct. N.Y.); Seabrook v.
Commuter Hous. Co., 72 Misc. 2d 6, 8, 338 N.Y.S.2d 67, 69 (Civ. Ct. N..Y. 1972). But see
Weidman v. Tomaselli, 81 Misc. 2d 328, 333, 365 N.Y.S.2d 681, 688 (Rockland County Ct.
1975).
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person with the knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or goods
involved in the transaction."
Merchants are held to a set of rules which are stricter than the
rules applied to nonmerchants. Given this higher standard, a person
who contracts with a merchant will find himself "in a more favora-
ble position with the court and protected to a greater extent than if
he had contracted with a nonmerchant."59 Having recognized land-
lords as merchants, courts should apply this higher standard when
a merchant-landlord deals with a nonmerchant-tenant.
IV. The Lease as an Adhesion Contract
Modem leases for residential units are often adhesion contracts. 0
Contracts of adhesion are agreements in which one party merely
adheres to a document drafted by another, more powerful, party."
The process of entering into a contract of adhesion "is not one of
haggle or cooperative process but rather of fly and flypaper. '6 2
Because most residential landlords use a standard form lease, 3
the tenant has no choice but to sign it. Professor Friedrich Kessler
described why such standard forms are adhesion contracts: 4
58. U.C.C. § 2-104(1).
59. Seabrook v. Commuter Hous. Co., 72 Misc. 2d 6, 8, 338 N.Y.S.2d 67, 69 (Civ. Ct. N.Y.
1972).
60. Cramer, Extension of the UCC's Unconscionability Contract Provision to Exculpatory
Lease Clauses, 5 AMER. Bus. L.J. 287, 290 (1967); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 5.6,
Reporter's Note 2 (1977); Note, High-Rise Apartment Leases as Adhesion Contracts, 22 CLEV.
ST. L. REV. 560 (1973); Note, The Form 50 Lease: Judicial Treatment of an Adhesion
Contract, 111 U. PA. L. REV. 1197 (1963).
61. Ehrenzweig, Adhesion Contracts in the Conflict of Laws, 53 COLUM. L. REv. 1072,1075
(1953). The term 'contract of adhesion' was introduced into American legal nomenclature by
Patterson, The Delivery of a Life Insurance Policy, 33 HARV. L. REv. 198, 222 (1919).
For other definitions and discussions of adhesion contracts, see Chandler v. Aero Mayflower
Transit Co., 374 F.2d 129, 135 n.11 (4th Cir. 1967); Standard Oil Co. of Calif. v. Perkins, 347
F.2d 379, 383 n.5 (9th Cir. 1965); Redding v. Gulf Oil Corp., 67 Misc. 2d 464, 466 n.1, 324
N.Y.S.2d 490, 492 n.1 (Sup. Ct. 1971), aff'd, 38 A.D.2d 850, 330 N.Y.S.2d 158 (2d Dep't 1972);
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 389-90, 161 A.2d 69, 86 (1960); Bekken
v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 70 N.D. 122, 143, 293 N.W. 200, 212 (1940).
62. Leff, Contract as a Thing, 19 AM. U. L. REV. 131, 143 (1970).
63. See Morbeth Realty Corp. v. Velez, 73 Misc. 2d 996, 1000, 343 N.Y.S.2d 406, 411 (Civ.
Ct. N.Y. 1973); Bentley, An Alternative Residential Lease, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 836, 836 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Bentley]; Berger, supra note 13, at 791; Kirby, Contract Law and the
Form Lease: Can Contract Law Provide the Answer?, 71 Nw. L. REv. 204, 204 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Kirby]; text accompanying notes 234-36 infra.
64. Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43
COLUM. L. REV. 629, 632 (1952).
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Standard contracts are typically used by enterprises with strong bargaining
power. The weaker party, in need of thegoods or services, is frequently not
in a position to shop around for better terms, either because the author of
the standard contract has a monopoly (natural or artificial) or because all
competitors use the same clauses. His contractual intention is but a subjec-
tion more or less voluntary to terms dictated by the stronger party, terms
whose consequences are often understood only in a vague way, if at all. Thus,
standardized contracts are frequently contracts of adhesion ...
Courts have recognized that standard form leases are often adhe-
sion contracts." However, the fact that a contract is a printed form
and offered on a "take-it-or-leave-it" basis alone does not make it
an adhesion contract." Other factors must be present. Although
there has been no authoritative analysis of the elements necessary
for the existence of an adhesion contract,"7 at least two elements
must be present: (1) a necessary, yet scarce, commodity and (2) a
bargaining position so unequal that the offeror can dictate the terms
of the contract."8
A. The Housing Shortage
In 1976, the vacancy rate for the total rental housing units in the
United States was 5.6%. For the northeastern region, the figure was
lower, 4.7%. Only 1.9% of the total rental units nationally were
vacant year-round in 1976.9 Courts across the nation have taken
judicial notice of the shortage of decent housing in the United
65. See, e.g., Santiago v. McElroy, 319 F. Supp. 284, 294 (E.D. Pa. 1970); McClelland-
Metz Mgt.; Inc. v. Faulk, 86 Misc. 2d 778, 780, 384 N.Y.S.2d 919,920 (Nassau Dist. Ct. 1976);
Avenue Assocs., Inc. v. Buxbaum, 83 Misc. 2d 134, 141, 371 N.Y.S.2d 736, 744 (Civ. Ct. N.Y.
1975); Galligan v: Arovitch, 421 Pa. 301, 304, 219 A.2d 463, 465 (1966); Blakely v. Hous. Auth.
of the County of King, 8 Wash. App. 204, 213, 505 P.2d 151, 156 (1973).
66. Clinic Masters, Inc. v. District Ct., 556 P.2d 473, 475 (Col. 1976); Weidman v. Toma-
selli, 81 Misc. 2d 328, 333, 365 N.Y.S.2d 681, 688 (Rockland County Ct. 1975). A standard
form contract results from some advantage of the offeror, not vice-versa. This advantage
makes possible the use of a form contract. Id.
67. See Leff, Contract as a Thing, 19 AM. U. L. REv. 131, 142-43 (1970); Ehrenzweig,
Adhesion Contracts in the Conflict of Laws, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 1072, 1088-89 (1953).
One court has listed four elements which all must be present for a contract to be deemed a
contract of adhesion: (1) a necessity of life, (2) a contract for the excessive benefit of the
offeror, (3) an economic or other advantage of the offeror, and (4) the offer of the proposed
contract on a "take it or leave it basis." Weidman v. Tomaselli, 81 Misc. 2d 328, 331, 365
N.Y.S.2d 681, 686 (Rockland County Ct. 1975).
68. See Weidman v. Tomaselli, 81 Misc. 2d 328, 331, 365 N.Y.S.2d 681, 686 (Rockland
County Ct. 1975); Avenue Assocs. Inc. v. Buxbaum, 83 Misc. 2d 134, 141, 371 N.Y.S.2d 736,
744 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1976).
69. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABsTRAcr OF THE UNITED STATES-786-87
(1977).
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States. 0 The tight rental market has given landlords a big edge in
negotiating with tenants.7
The New York courts, passing on the unconscionability of leases,
clearly have been impressed by the fact that tenants must deal in a
depressed housing situation and, hence, a landlord's market.',
Forced to deal in a landlord's market, tenants are not able to exer-
cise a meaningful choice.7 3 The result, as a court stated in 1762, is
that "necessitous men are not, truly speaking, free men, but, to
answer a present exigency, will submit to any terms that the crafty
may impose upon them."
B. The Landlord's Superior Bargaining Position
Already faced with a lack of adequate housing, tenants must deal
with landlords whose bargaining power is far superior to theirs.
Although fifty years ago the New York Court of Appeals stated that
landlords and tenants "stand upon equal terms [since] either may
equally well accept or refuse entry into the relationship of landlord
and tenant,"7 5 it is now recognized that there is a gross inequality
of bargaining power between a lessor and lessee." Courts consider
this inequality when passing on the validity of leases." As Justice
70. See, e.g., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1970);
Henrioulle v. Marin Ventures, Inc., 20 Cal. 3d 512, 519, 573 P.2d 465, 469, 143 Cal. Reptr.
247, 251 (1978); Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791, 794-95 (Iowa 1972); Steele v. Latimer, 214
Kan. 329, 331, 521 P.2d 304, 307-09 (1974); King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65, 71 (Mo. App.
1973); Kline v. Burns, 111 N.H. 87, 91, 276 A.2d 248, 251 (1971); Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J.
130, 141, 145, 265 A.2d 526, 532-33, 535 (1970).
71. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 26, 1978, § 8, at 1, col. 1.
72. See, e.g., cases cited in note 68 supra; State v. Bel Fior Hotel, 95 Misc. 2d 901, 905,
408 N.Y.S.2d 696, 699 (Sup. Ct. 1978); Edgemont Assocs. v. Skolnick, 90 Misc. 2d 761, 762,
396 N.Y.S.2d 130, 131-32, (Town of Greenburgh Justice Ct. 1977); Lefrak v. Lambert, 89
Misc. 2d 197, 205; 390 N.Y.S.2d 959, 965 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1976); Harwood v. Lincoln Sq. Apts.
Sec. 5, Inc., 78 Misc. 2d 1097, 1099, 359 N.Y.S.2d 387, 390 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1974); Steinberg v.
Carreras, 74 Misc. 2d 32, 35, 344 N.Y.S.2d 136, 142 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1973).
73. State v. Bel Fior Hotel, 95 Misc. 2d 901, 905, 408 N.Y.S.2d 696, 699 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
74. Vernon v. Bethell, 28 Eng. Rep. 838, 839 (Ch. 1762).
75. Kirshenbaum v. General Outdoor Advertising Co., 258 N.Y. 489, 495, 180 N.E. 245,
247 (1932).
76. See 2 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 221(1) (1977).
77. See, e.g., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1970);
Kuzmiak v. Brookchester, Inc., 33 N.J. Super. 575, 588, 111 A.2d 425, 431 (1955); 57 E. 54
Realty Corp. v. Gay Nineties Realty Corp., 71 Misc. 2d 353, 355, 335 N.Y.S.2d 872, 874 (App.
T. 1st Dep't 1972); Harwood. v. Lincoln Sq. Apts. Sec. 5, Inc., 78 Misc. 2d 1097, 1099, 359
N.Y.S.2d 387, 390 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1974). See also Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co.,
350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
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Frankfurter once stated: "Does any principle in our law have more
universal application than the doctrine that courts will not enforce
transactions in which the relative positions of the parties are such
that one has unconscionably taken advantage of the necessities of
the other?""8
There are several factors, besides scarcity, which put the tenant
in an inferior bargaining position. Residential tenants rarely are
represented by an attorney during the lease negotiations,79 while
landlords usually enjoy the benefit of counsel. Leases are compli-
cated documents, highly favorable to the landlord, which tenants
generally do not understand1 Landlords are an organized group, in
contrast to tenants who rarely organize to exercise group power,
particularly before they sign their leases."' When "negotiating" a
lease, a tenant is often under the pressure of time since his existing
lease is about to expire.12 After the lease is signed and a conflict
arises between a tenant and his landlord, the former very likely will
be unable to afford the costs of litigation.
83
C. Conclusion
Although the Official Comment to the U.C.C. suggests that the
mere exercise of superior bargaining power does not indicate uncon-
scionability," such inequality in bargaining positions combined
with the depressed housing situation suggests the presence of a con-
78. United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 315 U.S. 289, 326 (1942) (dissenting opinion).
See Post v. Jones, 60 U.S. (19 Howard) 150, 160 (1856); Parmelee v. Cameron, 41 N.Y. 392,
395 (1869).
79. Steinberg v. Carreras, 74 Misc. 2d 32, 35, 344 N.Y.S.2d 136, 142 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1973);
Kirby, supra note 63, at 232-33.
80. Avenue Assocs., Inc. v. Buxbaum, 83 Misc. 2d 134, 141, 371 N.Y.S.2d 736, 744 (Civ.
Ct. N.Y. 1975); Steinberg v. Carreras, 74 Misc. 2d 32, 35, 344 N.Y.S.2d 136, 142 (Civ. Ct.
N.Y. 1973); Seabrook v. Commuter Hous. Co., 72 Misc. 2d 6, 7, 338 N.Y.S.2d 67, 71 (Civ.
Ct. N.Y. 1972). See Mueller, Residential Tenants and their Leases: An Empirical Study, 69
MICH. L. REV. 247 (1970).
81. Steinberg v. Carreras, 74 Misc. 2d 32, 35, 344 N.Y.S.2d 136, 142 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1973).
82: Seabrook v. Commuter Hous. Co., 72 Misc. 2d 6, 7, 338 N.Y.S.2d 67, 69 (Civ. Ct. N.Y.
1972).
83. Kirby, supra note 63, at 233.
84. U.C.C. § 2-302, Comment 1; Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Distillers Co. Ltd., 395
F. Supp. 221, 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, CoNTRACS § 9-40 (2d ed. 1977).
It has been suggested, however, that a disparity in bargaining power is in sine qua non to a
finding of unconscionability. Comment, Bargaining Power and Unconscionability: A Sug-
gested Approach to UCC Section 2-302, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 998, 999 (1966).
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tract of adhesion. Clauses in an "adhesion lease" should be suspect
as unconscionable.8 5
V. The Unconscionable Lease Provisions
To date, courts have found the following lease clauses unconscion-
able under certain circumstances: (1) attorney's fees provisions, (2)
clauses exculpating landlord from liability for delay in delivery of
possession, and (3) clauses exculpating landlord from liability for
interruptions in services. In addition, certain rents and rent in-
creases have been struck down as unconscionable. There have also
been some types of clauses which, though not unconscionable per
se, were found to be unconscionable in the manner in which they
were enforced.
A. Attorney's Fees
Lease provisions requiring a tenant to reimburse his landlord for
attorney's fees and other expenses incurred by the landlord in insti-
tuting proceedings resulting from the tenant's default under the
lease have been held valid and not contrary to public policy, pro-
vided they are reasonable and not in the nature of a penalty.86 By
statute in New York, implied in any lease which contains such a
provision is a reciprocal covenant by the landlord to pay to the ten-
ant reasonable attorney's fees and expenses incurred by the tenant
as a result of the landlord's failure to perform any agreement under
the lease or in the successful defense of any action or summary
proceeding commenced by the landlord against the tenant arising
from the lease. 7 Any waiver of this statutory right is void as against
public policy." Thus, while the legislature has given a quid pro quo
to a tenant who signs a lease containing an attorney's fees provi-
sion, such a provision itself has not been considered unconscion-
able. The URLTA, however, prohibits any lease provision whereby
the tenant agrees to pay the landlord's attorney's fees.8
85. Adhesion clauses are prohibited by the URLTA. URLTA § 1.403, Comment. They are
also barred from inclusion in low-rent public housing leases. United States Department of
Housing and Urban Development, Circular RHM 7465.6 (Aug. 10, 1970).
86. 379 Madison Avenue, Inc. v. Stuyvesant Co., 242 A.D. 567, 569, 275 N.Y.S. 953, 956
(1st Dep't 1934), aff'd without opinion, 268 N.Y. 576, 198 N.E. 412 (1935).
87. N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 234 (McKinney 1968).
88. Id.
89. URLTA § 1.403(A)(3).
350 [Vol. VII
1979] LEASEHOLD UNCONSCIONABILITY 351
On the other hand, a lease provision" which requires the tenant
to pay the landlord a specified amount for legal expenses at the
commencement of the landlord's action against the tenant has been
held unconscionable." Such fees are in the nature of a penalty.2 If
the lease had provided for reasonable legal fees to be awarded to the
successful party, such a provision would be valid . 3
Even where a valid attorney's fee provision was involved, some
courts have refused, as a matter of public policy, to enforce the
provision against an indigent tenant represented by the Legal Aid
Society. 4 At least one court, however, has disagreed sharply with
these holdings."
An attorney's fee provisions, although otherwise valid, may be
90. See, e.g., The Real Estate Board of New York, Inc., Standard Form of Apartment
Lease, cl. 22 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Form Lease].
91. McClelland-Metz Mgt., Inc. v. Fault, 86 Misc. 2d 778, 781, 384 N.Y.S.2d 919, 921
(Nassau Dist. Ct. 1976); Weidman v. Tomaselli, 81 Misc. 2d 328, 335, 365 N.Y.S.2d 681, 690
(Rockland County Ct. 1975). The landlord's assertion that section 234 of the New York Real
Property Law would allow the tenant to seek equal compensation was held to be without merit
by the court:
The statutory right of the respondents [tenants], like the supposed contractual
right of the petitioner [landlord], begs the question of whether the attorney's fees
demanded are unconscionable. If attorney's fees payable by the respondent are uncons-
cionable [for any reason], then the reason or reasons make attorney's fees payable by
the petitioner unconscionable. The Legislature in its wisdom could not have intended
that the court countenance unconscionability by either party. . . . The statute does
not contemplate that a landlord and a tenant are to be put on equal footing in that
each is allowed to exact unconscionable attorney's fees one from the other.
Id. at 335-36, 365 N.Y.S.2d at 690.
92. Weidman v. Tomaselli, 81 Misc. 2d 328, 336, 365 N.Y.S.2d 680, 691 (Rockland County
Ct. 1975); McClelland-Metz Mgt., Inc. v. Faulk, 86 Misc. 2d 778, 781, 384 N.Y.S.2d 919, 921
(Nassau Dist. Ct. 1976).
93. McClelland-Metz Mgt., Inc. v. Faulk, 86 Misc. 2d 778, 781,,384 N.Y.S.2d 919, 921
(Nassau Dist. Ct. 1976); Weidman v. Tomaselli, 81 Misc. 2d 328, 336-37, 365 N.Y.S.2d 681,
691 (Rockland County Ct. 1975)(dictum).
94. Republic Co. v. Medina, 75 Misc. 2d 279, 279, 347 N.Y.S.2d 785, 785 (Nassau Dist.
Ct. 1973); Edot Realty Co. v. Levinson, 54 Misc. 2d 673, 674, 283 N.Y.S.2d 232, 233 (Civ.
Ct. N.Y. 1967).
95. Fairhaven Apts. v. James, 79 Misc. 2d 569, 571, 360 N.Y.S.2d 389, 391 (Nassau Dist.
Ct. 1974). The court felt it
not proper under the guise of public policy to ignore already existing legal agreements.
The mere fact that a tenant receives welfare is not sufficient to negate, cancel out or
cause to be null and void a written provision in a lease requiring the tenant to pay
attorney's fees because of the tenant's default and this notwithstanding the fact that
the tenant is indigent and must look to the county for the meeting of the tenant's
obligations.
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held unconscionable if it is a part of a standard form lease." At least
one court has agreed with the theory behind such an argument. A
stipulation of settlement signed by a landlord and tenant which
provided for the payment of the landlord's legal fees by the tenant
was held to be "a contract of adhesion as a matter of law and an
unconscionable bargain which equity will not enforce." 7 However,
in a commercial leasing situation, where the bargaining positions of
the parties are more equal, an attorney's fee agreement was held not
to be an adhesion contract."
B. Delay in Delivery of Possession
New York tenants have a statutory right to actual possession of
the leasehold at the beginning of their terms.9 The statute abro-
gates the New York common law rule that the landlord impliedly
covenants only that the tenants shall have the legal right to posses-
sion at the beginning of the term and not that the landlord cove-
nants to put the tenant in possession as against an intruder.'""
Nevertheless, the statute gives the landlord a loophole-the im-
plied condition to deliver possession at the beginning of the term
can be waived by an express provision to the contrary.""1 Most form
leases contain such express provisions.10 The courts, however, are
questioning the conscionability of these exculpation clauses.
In a case involving a family in urgent need of an apartment in
96. Kirby, supra note 63, at 222-23.
97. Bernard v. Kuha, 90 Misc. 2d 148, 153, 394 N.Y.S.2d 782, 786 (Rockland County Ct.
1977).
98. Mury v. Tublitz, 151 N.J. Super. 39, 376 A.2d 547 (1977) (per curiam). The court
reversed a lower court's ruling that a lease containing an attorney's fee provision with a
minimum amount determined by a percentage of the amount owed the landlord by the tenant
was a contract of adhesion because there was no record that the parties were in unequal
bargaining positions when the lease was executed. Id. at 44, 376 A.2d at 549. See also Equita-
ble Lumber Corp. v. IPA Land Dev. Corp., 38 N.Y.2d 516, 523, 344 N.S.2d 391, 396, 381
N.Y.S.2d 459, 464 (1976)(attorney's fee provision in contract was not unconscionable under
U.C.C. § 2-302 since contract was not one of adhesion).
99. N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 223-a (McKinney 1968).
100. Gardiner v. Keteltas, 3 Hill 330, 331-33 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1842). By changing the
common law rule, the New York legislature, in effect, was adopting the English rule, which
imposes a duty upon the landlord to deliver actual possession at the beginning of the term,
thereby shifting to the landlord the risk of wrongdoing by a third person. See Coe v. Clay,
130 Eng. Rep. 1131, 1131 (C.P. 1829); STATE OF NEW YORK, REPORT OF THE LAW REVISION
COMMISSION 452 (1962).
101. N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 223-a (McKinney 1968).
102. See, e.g., Form Lease, supra note 90, cl. 3.
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New York City, the landlord was unable to deliver possession for
three months after the beginning of the term because of a hold-over
tenant. 03 Although the lease contained a provision which stated the
clause to be "'an express provision to the contrary' within the
meaning of Section 223-a of the New York Real Property Law," the
court held that section 235-c should apply and declared the lease
provision unconscionable "under the circumstances."' 10
Before section 235-c was enacted, a court held similar exculpatory
clauses unconscionable in Seabrook v. Commuter Housing Co.,
Inc."'- At issue was a four-month wait in delivery due to a delay in
construction of the apartment building. The court noted that the
exculpatory clauses neither set forth a reasonable period for exten-
sion of the time of commencement of the lease nor gave the tenant
the option of cancelling the lease agreement if the premises were not
ready for occupancy within a reasonable time after the lease was to
commence. The court held that the landlord had a duty to set forth
a reasonable time limit and to explain the exculpation clauses to the
tenant."6 Although previous decisions had held that a reasonable
time for delivery of possession will be implied in such exculpatory
clauses, 17 the Seabrook court held that the landlord should set forth
affirmatively a reasonable time limit. 108
Possibly in an effort to comply with Seabrook, the standard form
lease used by many residential landlords in New York has 'been
changed. It now provides the tenant an opportunity, after a
"reasonable period" has elapsed, to give the landlord written notice
of termination. The notice must state that, in the tenant's opinion,
a second "reasonable period" will have elapsed at a date not less
103. Gutterman v. 985 Fifth Ave., Inc., N.Y.L.J., Sept. 9,1977, at 7, col. 2 (Civ. Ct. N.Y.).
The landlord failed to inform the new tenant that the holdover tenant had been reneging on
promises to vacate for over a year. Id.
104. Id. at 12, col. 1.
105. 72 Misc. 2d 6, 11, 338 N.Y.S.2d 67, 73 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1972), aff'd, 79 Misc. 2d 168,
363 N.Y.S.2d 566 (App. T. 2d Dep't 1973).
106. 72 Misc. 2d at 11, 338 N.Y.S.2d at 72-73.
107. Hartwig v. 6465 Realty Co., 67 Misc. 2d 450, 451, 324 N.Y.S.2d 567, 568 (App. T.
1st Dep't 1971)(per curiam) (eight-month delay in delivery of possession, after one-fifth of
term had expired, was held unreasonable).
108. 72 Misc. 2d at 11, 338 N.Y.S.2d at 72-73. The appellate term, affirming, said it was
unnecessary to consider whether the doctrine of unconscionability should be applied since the
landlord failed to satisfy its implied promise to deliver possession on the date fixed by the
lease or within a reasonable time. 79 Misc. 2d 168, 168, 363 N.Y.S.2d 566, 567 (2d Dep't
1973)(per curiam).
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than thirty days from the date of the notice, at which date the lease
shall terminate. However, the burden of deciding what a reasonable
time is still remains on the tenant. To further complicate the ten-
ant's position, the standard exculpatory clause, while allowing for
the rent payments to be suspended during the period of delay, spe-
cifically states that the landlord's failure to give possession shall not
extend the term of the lease."" It is not hard to envision a tenant,
unsure when a "reasonable period" has elapsed, being held to his
lease by a landlord when less than one-half of his leasehold term
remains and when the tenant has signed a lease for other premises.
If the landlord brings the tenant into court for non-payment of rent,
the court can declare such a lease provision unconscionable.
C. Interruption of Services
Since 1975, first by court decision"' and then by statute,"' New
York tenants have been protected by an implied warranty of habita-
bility. The modern tenant, however, contracts not only for the
premises but for a package of services to be supplied by the land-
lord."3 Although the statute bars any waiver of the implied war-
ranty,"' landlords have attempted to exculpate themselves from
any liability caused by interruptions in essential services."'
In Groner v. Lakeview Management Corp.,"' the courts consid-
ered such an exculpatory clause."' In addition to other complaints,
the tenant claimed that her apartment, over a period of three years,
was without heat and hot water for six days during the winter
109. Form Lease, supra note 90, cl. 3.
110. Id.
111. Tonetti v. Penati, 48 A.D.2d 25, 29, 367 N.Y.S.2d 804, 808 (2d Dep't 1975).
112. N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 235-b (McKinney Supp. 1978).
113. See notes 53 & 54 supra & accompanying text.
114. N.Y. REAL PRop. LAW § 235-b(2) (McKinney Supp. 1978).
115. One of the most recent standard form leases contains a provisions stating:
As long as Tenant obeys all of the provisions of the Lease, Landlord will give to
Tenant, only insofar as the existing building equipment and facilities provide, the
following services:
(1) elevator service; (2) hot and cold water in reasonable amounts at all times; (3)
heat as required by law ...
Stoppage or reduction of any of the above services shall not entitle Tenant to any
allowance or reduction of rent unless as provided by law.
Form Lease, supra note 90, cl. 10.
116. 83 Misc. 2d 932, 373 N.Y.S.2d 807 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1975).
117. The lease provision in question was almost identical to the provision set forth in note
115 supra. d. at 934, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 809.
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months and elevator service for forty-five days. After deciding that
the tenant could sue affirmatively for damages on a claim of breach
of the warranty of habitability,"' the court considered the exculpa-
tory lease clause and held it to be "a classic example of unconsciona-
bility."" ' The court refused to enforce the clause and awarded dam-
ages to the tenant.'20
The unconscionability of these clauses does not depend on the
warranty of habitability. Even before New York adopted the doc-
trine of the implied warranty, a clause exculpating a landlord from
any liability for an interruption or curtailment in services was held
unconscionable.'' At issue was a complete stoppage of an apart-
ment building's central air conditioning system for six weeks during
the summer. The court interpreted the lease clause to mean that the
tenant agreed to release the landlord from liability only for slight
interruptions of services but not for major ones.' 2
118. Id. at 935, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 810. Previously, the doctrine of implied warranty of
habitability had been applied mainly as a defense or setoff in nonpayment summary proceed-
ings. Id. at 932, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 809-10.
119. Id. at 934, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 809.
120. Id. at 935, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 810. However, since there was inadequate proof of dam-
ages, the tenant was limited to nominal damages. Id. See Steinberg v. Carreras, 77 Misc. 2d
774, 775, 357 N.Y.S.2d 369, 370 (App. T. 1st Dep't 1974)(per curiam) (reversing lower court's
award of set-off to tenant due to lack of heat because there was no adequate proof or reduced
value of premises as a result of lack of heat).
In 1976, the warranty of habitability statute was amended to provide that expert testimony
not be required for a court to determine the amount of damages sustained by a tenant as a
result of a breach of the warranty. N.Y. REAL PROP. LAw § 235-b(3) (McKinney Supp. 1978).
See Park West Mgt. Corp. v. Mitchell, 62 A.D.2d 291, 404 N.Y.S.2d 115 (1st Dep't 1978)(af-
firming 10% rent abatement due to interruption in garbage removal and janitorial services);
Kekllas v. Saddy, 88 Misc. 2d 1042, 389 N.Y.S.2d 756 (Nassau Dist. Ct. 1976)(awarding only
nominal damages because tenant failed to prove any actual damages caused by presence of
odor of cat urine).
121. Harwood v. Lincoln Sq. Apts. Sec. 5, Inc., 78 Misc. 2d 1097, 1100, 359 N.Y.S.2d 387,
391 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1974).
122. Id. at 1098, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 390. Just five months before this decision, the same court
considered a similar case but refused to hold the landlord liable for damages. Hausman v.
Residential Funding Corp., 76 Misc. 2d 522, 351 N.Y.S.2d 265 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1973). The case
involved an exculpatory clause identical to the one in Harwood and a suspension of air
conditioning for 39 summer days. Though the court expressed its displeasure with the excul-
patory clause, it refused to find that the landlord had either a contractual or statutory duty
to repair the air conditioning system despite the landlord's covenant in the lease to provide
such a service. The court noted, but seemingly did not base its decision on, the fact that the
landlord had incurred $22,000 in expenses in an attempt to repair the system. Id. at 523-24,
351 N.Y.S.2d at 267-68. Harwood, to the contrary, held that the tenant could recover for
the landlord's breach of his covenant to supply air conditioning. 78 Misc. 2d at 1110, 359
N.Y.S.2d at 391. For a discussion of Harwood and Hausman, see Kirby, supra note 63, at
228-29.
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Leasehold unconscionability will prove to be a strong tool for
courts to use against landlords seeking to shield themselves from
liability, even where a statutory authorization of the landlords' ac-
tions exists. Courts will not allow landlords to escape liability for
excessive interruptions in services.
D. The Unconscionable Rent
Unfair price agreements have never been looked upon favorably
by the courts.2 3 The U.C.C. unconscionability provision is used to
strike down contract sale prices which the courts deem unconsciona-
ble.' 4 The first reported case employing the U.C.C. provision has
been cited for the general proposition that extreme inadequacy of
consideration may constitute unconscionability.' 5
Courts also use the doctrine of unconscionability to prohibit un-
duly high rents. In one of the first leasehold unconscionability deci-
sions, a court held that the renewal rent set by a landlord for a
commercial tenant was unconscionable. 2 ' The lease allowed the
tenant to renew for an additional term at a rent to be determined
by the landlord.' The landlord increased the rent for the new term
by $1600 a month-from $400 to $2000 per month. The court stated
that "[tihe law in such cases (i.e., lease renewals) properly imposes
a condition that the rentals so fixed be not arbitrary and uncons-
cionable."''  The court affirmed'' a lower court ruling that a new
trial be ordered to determine a rent "not unconscionable in the
123. See Hume v. United States, 132 U.S. 406 (1889); Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172
F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1948); Greer v. Tweed, 13 Abb. Pr. (n.s.) 427 (C.P. 1872); James v. Morgan,
83 Eng. Rep. 323 (K.B. 1793).
124. Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 59 Misc. 2d 189, 191-92, 298 N.Y.S.2d 264, 266 (Sup. Ct.
1969); State v. ITM, Inc., 52 Misc. 2d 39, 53, 275 N.Y.S.2d 303, 321 (Sup. Ct. 1966); Frosti-
fresh Corp. v. Reynoso, 52 Misc. 2d 26, 27, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757, 759 (Nassau Dist. Ct. 1966),
rev'd per curiam, 54 Misc. 2d 119, 281 N.Y.S.2d 964 (App. T. 2d Dep't 1967).
125. American Home Improvement, Inc. v. MacIver, 105 N.H. 435, 201 A.2d 886 (1964).
The case involved a charge of $2,568.60 for goods and services valued at $959. The customer
was charged with an $800 commission plus interest and carrying charges totalling $809.60.
Id. at 439, 201 A.2d at 888. See Note, Commercial Decency and the Code-The Doctrine of
Unconscionability Vindicated, 9 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1143, 1155 (1968); Comment,
Unconscionability-The Code, the Court and the Consumer, 9 B.C. IND. & COMM. L. REV.
367, 371 (1968).
126. Tai on Luck Corp. v. Cirota, 35 A.D.2d 380, 381, 316 N.Y.S.2d 438, 439 (1st Dep't
1970), appeal dismissed, 29 N.Y.2d 747, motion for reconsideration of dismissal denied, 29
N.Y.2d 868 (1971).
127. 35. A.D.2d at 381, 316 N.Y.S.2d at 439.




circumstances, upon proof of all relevant factors and not necessarily
confined to what may be deemed a reasonable rent.' 13 On remand,
the trial court fixed the rental at $525 a month. 13
Since section 235-c was enacted, a court refused to pass on a rent
increase against mobile home tenants because the tenants rented
under a month-to-month tenancy, which is not a leasehold ten-
ancy, and thus, not covered by the statute.'3 The court, moreover,
found an alternative ground to hold against the tenants. Assum-
ing there had been a lease to satisfy section 235-c, the court
reasoned a request for a rent increase would not be covered by the
statute since the rent increase request was not part of the lease when
the lease was made.'1 It appears, then, that the unconscionability
statute cannot be applied to rent increases since it requires a show-
ing of unconscionability when the lease was made.' 34 Nevertheless,
there is no reason why a court could not invoke its equitable powers
to hold a rent increase unconscionable.'3
Although courts require a showing of unequal bargaining power
to hold a lease or contract unconscionable,'30 many of the decisions
concerning unconscionable rents or prices concern a particular type
of unequal bargaining-that involving non-English speaking ten-
ants'137 or customers 38 who are often on public assistance. Although
the leasehold unconscionability decisions have considered the land-
130. N.Y.L.J., May 25, 1970, at 2, col. 2 (App. T. 1st Dep't).
131. 69 Misc. 2d 925, 928, 331 N.Y.S.2d 250, 253 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1972). The court consid-
ered the following factors in determining a rent figure: the location of the store, the condition
of the economy, the dollar purchasing value, real estate taxes, and the long tenure (fifty-
five years) of the tenant. Id.
132. Valley Forge Village v. Anthony, 92 Misc. 2d 1007, 1009-10, 401 N.Y.S.2d 978, 980
(Suffolk Dist. Ct.) aff'd per curiam, 96 Misc. 2d 62, 409 N.Y.S.2d 957 (App. T. 2d Dep't
1978). See text accompanying notes 250-57 infra.
133. 92 Misc. 2d 1010, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 980.
134. N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 235-c(1) (McKinney Supp. 1978).
135. See Tai on Luck Corp. v. Cirota, 35 A.D.2d 380, 316 N.Y.S.2d 438 (1st Dep't 1970);
cases cited in note 123 supra.
136. See notes 29-34 supra & accompanying text.
137. Yengel v. Martinez, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 9,1975, at 21, col. 3 (Civ. Ct. N.Y.).
138. Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 59 Misc. 2d 189, 298 N.Y.S.2d 264 (Sup. Ct. 1969);
Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso, 52 Misc. 2d 26, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757 (Nassau Dist. Ct. 1966). See
also Brooklyn Union Gas Co. v. Jimeniz, 82 Misc. 2d 948, 371 N.Y.S.2d 289 (Civ. Ct. N.Y.
1975)(contract to buy gas conversion burner signed by non-English speaking person held
unconscionable); Jefferson Credit Corp. v. Marcano, 60 Misc. 2d 138, 302 N.Y.S.2d 390 (Civ.
Ct. N.Y. 1969)(automobile sales contract in which non-English speaking buyer waived war-
ranties of merchantability and fitness held unconscionable).
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lord's superior bargaining powers, 3 ' it may be necessary to show a
language barrier or economic weakness in order to have a rental
price held unconscionable. 0
This is particularly true in cases involving "two leases," a ploy
commonly used by landlords against tenants on public assistance.
The landlord requires a tenant who is a welfare recipient to agree
to a rental above the maximum provided by the Department of
Social Services. The parties then enter into a side agreement,
usually oral, for a rental greater than that stated in the lease. The
tenant usually makes up the difference out of his food allowance.'
These ploys generally have been held unenforceable.4 2 Noting that
a tenant on welfare has the particular handicap of having to find
an apartment at a rental permitted by the welfare regulations, a
court has stated "the unequal bargaining power of the parties com-
bined with the economic plight of the tenant . .. raises a valid
equitable defense of economic duress or coercion.""' Where there
was no economic coercion, a court refused to hold the second lease
unconscionable. 14
Now, even tenants whose premises are not rent-controlled will
find protection from unreasonable rents. This does not mean, how-
ever, that courts will become rent control boards. A landlord not
subject to rent control laws still has the freedom to contract a fair
rental price. It is the price so unfair that it is unconscionable which
a court will refuse to enforce.
E. Unconscionable Enforcement of Conscionable Lease
Provisions
Most leases contain a provision that the landlord's failure to en-
force any lease provision does not mean that he has waived his right
139. See cases cited in note 77 supra.
140. See Ellinghaus, In Defense of Unconscionability, 78 YALE L.J. 757, 768-71 (1969).
But see Euclid Ave. Assocs. v. City of N.Y., 64 A.D.2d 550, 406 N.Y.S.2d 844 (1st Dep't 1978)
(mem.).
141. Tinnin v. Tinnin, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 16, 1975, at 20, col. 1 (Civ. Ct. N.Y.).
142. Id., McGarvey v. Johnson, N.Y.L.J., May 14, 1975, at 21, col. 1 (Civ. Ct. N.Y.);
Yengel v. Martinez, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 9, 1975, at 21, col. 3 (Civ. Ct. N.Y.). However, the courts
are split on whether, once they have held the second lease unconscionable, the tenant is
entitled to a set-off for the over-payments made in the past. Tinnin and Yengel allowed a
set-off; McGarvey did not.
143. McGarvey v. Johnson, N.Y.L.J., May 14, 1975, at 21, col. 2 (Civ. Ct. N.Y.).
144. Nethersole v. Brown, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 22, 1978, at 10, col. 1 (Civ. Ct. N.Y.). This case
did not involve two leases for one apartment but two leases for two apartments. The tenant
got the Department of Social Services' approval to rent one apartment but then signed a lease
to rent a larger one. Id. at 10, col. 4.
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to do so in the future."' In addition, leases often state that the
manner in which rules and regulations contained in the lease are
enforced against one tenant shall have no effect on other tenants.',
Several court decisions, however, may have made these provisions
meaningless. Courts are not allowing landlords to enforce a lease
provision merely to harass tenants or to use the provision as an
excuse for evicting tenants for other reasons.
The right of a tenant to keep an animal in his apartment is an
example of a court's refusal to permit an unconscionable enforce-
ment of a conscionable lease provision. Many leases prohibit the
harboring of any animals unless the tenant has received express
written permission from the landlord."7 Other leases contain an
absolute prohibition against the harboring of animals. Both types
of clauses have been held enforceable many times.' In addition,
violations of such prohibitions are considered substantial breaches
of the lease agreement and, thus, grounds for eviction.' The fact
that the landlord has collected rent payments with knowledge of the
violation or that the landlord has permitted other tenants to violate
the prohibition has not been considered a waiver of the prohibition
as it applies to any other tenant.M
145. See, e.g., Form Lease, supra note 90, cl. 25(A).
146. See, e.g., id., cl. 9. If the landlord fails to enforce a provision under a lease or a similar
lease, such action is a factor to consider when determining if the provision is unconscionable.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 5.6, Comment e (1977).
147. See, e.g., Form Lease, supra note 90, Rule and Regulation 13.
148. For decisions upholding lease provisions allowing animals, only with the landlord's
permission, see 930 Fifth Avenue v. King, 40 A.D.2d 140, 142, 338 N.Y.S.2d 773, 775 (1st Dep't
1972)(per curiam), appeal dismissed, 31 N.Y. 2d 1046 (1973); Hillman Housing Corp. v.
Krupnik, 40 A.D.2d 788, 788, 337 N.Y.S.2d 547, 548 (1st Dep't 1972)(mem.). For decisions
upholding lease provisions completely prohibiting animals, see Pollack v. J.A. Green Con-
struction Corp., 40 A.D.2d 996, 997, 338 N.Y.S.2d 486, 487 (2d Dep't 1972)(mem.), aff'd
without opinion, 32 N.Y.2d 720, 297 N.E.2d 99, 344 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1973); Riverbay Corp. v.
Klinghoffer, 34 A.D.2d 630, 630, 309 N.Y.S.2d 472, 473 (1st Dep't 1970).
149. 930 Fifth Avenue v. King, 40 A.D.2d 140, 142, 338 N.Y.S.2d 773, 775 (1st Dep't
1972)(per curiam); Pollack v. J.A. Green Construction Corp., 40 A.D.2d 996, 997, 338
N.Y.S.2d 486, 487 (2d Dep't 1972)(mem.).
150. Pollack v. J.A. Green Construction Corp., 40 A.D.2d 996, 997, 338 N.Y.S.2d 486, 487
(2d Dep't 1972)(mem.); Riverbay Corp. v. Klinghoffer, 34 A.D.2d 630, 630, 309 N.Y.S.2d 472,
474 (1st Dep't 1970)(mem.); 930 Fifth Avenue v. King, 40 A.D.2d 140, 141-42, 338 N.Y.S.2d
773, 775 (1st Dep't 1972)(per curiam); Luna Park Housing Corp. v. Besser, 38 A.D.2d 713,
714, 329 N.Y.S.2d 332, 333 (2d Dep't 1972)(mem.). But see New York Life Insur. Co. v. Dick,
71 Misc. 2d 52, 59-60, 335 N.Y.S.2d 802, 808-09 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1972).
There is no requirement that a landlord treat each of his tenants in the same manner with
respect to every lease provision. A landlord may waive a provision for one tenant but strictly
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In Belmar Realty Corp. v. Brown, "I the Civil Court of the City of
New York held unconscionable a lease provision which allowed the
harboring of animals only with the landlord's permission and which
stated that such permission, if given, is revocable at anytime by the
landlord.5 The court distinguished the case from one involving a
lease containing an absolute prohibition against pets. 53 It did not,
however, distinguish the case from those where lease provisions al-
lowing pets only with the landlord's permission were held valid. 5
The unconscionability in Belmar stemmed from the fact that the
landlord could arbitrarily and capriciously withdraw his permission.
Thus, although the court held the provision itself unconscionable,
in light of the well-settled rule that a landlord can require his con-
sent for the harboring of an animal,'55 the decision must be read to
mean that, once the landlord has given his consent, he cannot re-
voke it without good reason. 5 If the animal proves to be a nuisance,
there would be good cause to withdraw consent. Where the landlord
is merely looking for an excuse to evict the tenant, such would be
an unconscionable enforcement of the lease.
Another example of the unconscionable enforcement of a lease
provision is 57 E. -54 Realty Corp. v. Gay Nineties Realty Corp.'5
enforce it against another. 930 Fifth Avenue Corp. v. King, 64 Misc. 2d 776, 779, 315 N.Y.S.2d
966, 969 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 71 Misc. 2d 359, 336 N.Y.S.2d 22 (App. T. 1st Dep't),
rev'd on other grounds per curiam, 40 A.D.2d 140, 338 N.Y.S.2d 773 (1st Dep't 1972). How-
ever, the New York Court of Appeals has indicated that if the tenant could prove that the
landlord exercised unreasonable discrimination among tenants, and thereby breached his
implied obligation to exercise good faith in any dealings, there may be a waiver of the
prohibition. See Brigham Park Coop. Apts. Sec. No. 2, Inc. v. Kraus, 21 N.Y.2d 941, 943,
327 N.E.2d 86, 86, 289 N.Y.S.2d 769, 770 (1968)(mem.), aff'g 28 A.D.2d 846, 282 N.Y.S.2d
938 (2d Dep't 1967)(mem.). The dissent in the appellate division thought a triable issue
existed concerning the landlord's discriminatory practice. Id. at 846, 282 N.Y.S.2d at 938.
151. N.Y.L.J., July 25, 1974, at 11, col. 2 (Civ. Ct. N.Y.).
152. Id. Leases generally provide for such revocation of consent. See, e.g., Form Lease,
supra note 90, Rule and Regulation 13.
153. N.Y.L.J., July 25, 1974, at 11, col. 2 (Civ. Ct. N.Y.).
154. See cases cited in note 148 supra. The decisions in these cases do not indicate whether
the landlord could revoke his consent.
155. See cases cited in note 148 supra.
156. The court noted that the dog involved had not been charged with any nuisance, was
carefully controlled by the tenant, was well-liked by other tenants, and was one of several
dogs known by the landlord to be kept in the building. The court was not perturbed by the
fact that the tenant had never obtained written permission to harbor the dog. N.Y.L.J., July
25, 1974, at 11, col. 2.
157. 71 Misc. 2d 353, 335 N.Y.S.2d 872 (App. T. 1st Dep't 1972), leave to appeal denied,
N.Y.L.J., Oct. 18, 1972, at 2, col. 1 (App. T. 1st Dep't).
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The commercial tenant held a fifteen-year lease with nine years to
run. Although the record showed that the tenant had been late with
his rent payments during the prior five years and that the landlord
had always accepted the late payments without invoking the right
of termination, the landlord decided to enforce the termination pro-
visions'55 after a late payment.' 9 The trial court held for the tenant,
on the basis of an estoppel defense.6 0 The appellate court, however,
went further. After noting that a requirement of good faith between
landlords and tenants is now being read into leases, the court stated
that the "[liandlord's effort to bring tenant's lease to an end by
subtle device verges on the unconscionable."'' The court was con-
cerned not with an unconscionable lease, but with the landlord's
unconscionable behavior, which the court called "surreptitious."'6 2
In SKD Enterprises, Inc. v. L & M Offset Inc., 3 a lease provision
required the tenant to install any sprinkler system ordered by a
governmental unit. The fire department determined that a sprinkler
system was necessary for the tenant to legally conduct his off-set
printing business. The landlord demanded that the tenant pay one-
half the cost of the sprinkler system, which was twice the amount
of rent remaining under the lease. Noting that the sprinkler system
would be of substantial benefit to the landlord but of minimal bene-
fit to the tenant, the court held unconscionable a construction of the
lease provision requiring the tenant to pay for an improvement
which was worthless to him.'
In another case, a court considered a law firm's lease provision
permitting the landlord to discontinue certain services.6 5 The land-
lord claimed that the clause gave him a right to discontinue sub-
metering electric current service to the tenant. If the landlord dis-
continued the sub-metering practice, the tenant would have had to
158. For an example of such a provision, see Form Lease, supra note 90, cl. 19.
159. 71 Misc. 2d at 355, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 874 (concurring opinion).
160. Berger, supra note 13, at 807. The trial court opinion is unreported. Professor Berger
culled the facts not appearing in the appellate term opinion from the pleadings and briefs.
Id. at 806 n.64.
161. 71 Misc. 2d 353-54, 335 N.Y.S.2d 872-73 (App. T. 1st Dep't 1972).
162. Id. at 355, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 874 (emphasis added). See Berger, supra note 13, at 808.
Professor Berger questions whether, the more one-sided the lease, the more the landlord must
act fairly. Id.
163. 65 Misc. 2d 612, 318 N.Y.S.2d 539 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1971).
164. Id. at 612-15, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 540-43.
165. DiCostanzo v. Court Tower Corp., 410 N.Y.S.2d 212, 213 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
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obtain direct electric current service, at a cost of $10,000. The ten-
ant claimed that the lease did not apply to the electical equipment
present at the time of the execution of the lease. The court rejected
both arguments and examined the intentions of the parties when
they agreed to the provision. It was inconceivable to the court that
the landlord would want or allow each of more than thirty tenants
to install his own electrical current service. "7 Nor did the court
think it conceivable that the parties agreed the landlord could, "out
of sheer spite, vengeance, or retaliatory motive," require the tenant
with a short term remaining to incur an installation more costly
than the rental owed.'6 8 No other tenant was given notice of discon-
tinuance of the sub-metering service and the landlord admitted its
action was motivated by the tenant's success in a previous nonpay-
ment proceeding.'6 Holding that the construction of the provision
as claimed by the landlord was conceived with retaliatory motives
and was not contemplated by the parties, the court enjoined the
landlord from terminating the electrical current service to the ten-
ant. 170
Other cases involve an unconscionable result as opposed to an
unconscionable means.'7' Though section 235-c empowers the court
to "so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid
any unconscionable result,"'7 the statute assumes the court to have
already declared the clause unconscionable, not just the result. For
a clause to be held unconscionable, the court must find it was un-
conscionable at the time it was made.73 Courts, therefore, are on
166. Id. at 213-14.
167. Id. at 214.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 213.
170. Id. at 215.
171. See Friedman v. Jordan, N.Y.L.J., June 9, 1977, at 5, col. 4 (Sup. Ct.) aff'd without
opinion, 60 A.D.2d 1008, 401 N.Y.S.2d 672 (1st Dep't 1970) (hearing ordered under section
235-c to determine if a tenant, who obtained a stipulation setting her rent at $132.25 a month,
can sub-let apartment for three years at monthly rental of $350); 64 Univ. Place v. Samstein,
N.Y.L.J., June 13, 1978, at 10, col. 1 (Civ. Ct. N.Y.) (although lease provision requiring
tenant to pay share of building's electric bill in proportion to amount of space he occupies is
not unconscionable, manner in which clause is applied may be unconscionable if some ten-
ants consume more than normal share); Pine Top Assocs. v. Hirsch and Sons Deli World,
Inc., 92 Misc. 2d 470, 400 N.Y.S.2d 665 (Town of Greenburgh Justice Ct. 1977)(unconsciona-
ble to evict commercial assignee when assignor failed to get landlord's permission to assign
lease).
172. N.Y. REAL PRop. LAW § 235-c (McKinney Supp. 1978).
173. Id.; 200 East Tenants Corp. v. Sherry, N.Y.L.J., May 10, 1978, at 11, col. 1-2 (Sup.
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uncertain ground if they rely on section 235-c to hold the
enforcement of a lease clause, but not the clause itself, unconsciona-
ble. Courts, however, are not powerless to act in such cases. They
can invoke the equitable doctrine of unconscionability", to police
against unconscionable results such as the use of a lease provision
for a retaliatory or capricious motive.7 5
VI. Unconscionability and Commercial Leases
Most of the cases discussed thus far involved leases of residential
property. When a tenant under a commercial lease petitions a court
Ct.); Valley Forge Village v. Anthony, 92 Misc. 2d 1007,1010, 401 N.Y.S.2d 978, 980 (Suffolk
Dist. Ct.), aff'd per curiam, 96 Misc. 2d 62, 409 N.Y.S.2d 957 (App. T. 2d Dep't 1978). See
text accompanying notes 258-63 infra.
174. See notes 22-24 supra and accompanying text; Berger, supra note 13, at 805-06.
175. " Several other decisions have held a variety of lease provisions unconscionable. The
use of a "savings clause" in a renewal lease of an apartment subject to rent stabilization has
been deemed unconscionable since it places an unreasonable burden on tenants to determine
the legal effects of their lease provisions. Kips Bay Towers, Inc. v. Armstrong, 82 Misc. 2d
489, 368 N.Y.S.2d 417, 372 N.Y.S.2d 437 (Civ. Ct. N.Y.), aff'd per curiam, 85 Misc. 2d 342,
378 N.Y.S.2d 652 (App. T. 1st Dep't 1975). A court found unconscionable a lease provision
holding all the student-tenants liable for any damage when it could not be determined who
was responsible or if the tenant who was responsible was unable to pay for the repair. State
v. Bel Fior Hotel, 95 Misc. 2d 901, 408 N.Y.S.2d 696 (Sup. Ct. 1978). Applying section 235-c,
a court invalidated a lease application stating a real estate broker was entitled to a fee from
a prospective tenant when the broker found an apartment for the tenant even if the tenant
did not take the apartment. Sidnam v. Washington Sq. Realty Corp., 95 Misc. 2d 825, 408
N.Y.S.2d 988 (App. T. 1st Dep't 1978)(per curiam). Another court ordered a hearing to
determine if a lease provision waiving the tenant's right to bring a counter-claim in a sum-
mary proceeding brought by the landlord was unconscionable. Edgemont Assocs. v. Skolnick,
90 Misc. 2d 761, 396 N.Y.S.2d 130 (Town of Greenburgh Justice Ct. 1977). However, such
waivers do not offend public policy. Linker v. Herard, 13 Misc. 2d 445, 180 N.Y.S.2d 793
(App. T. 2d Dep't 1958)(per curiam); Amazon Mgt. Corp. v. Paff, 166 Misc. 2d 438, 1
N.Y.S.2d 976 (App. T. 2d Dept. 1938). But a waiver of the right to counter-claim in any
type of proceeding brought by the landlord was held unconscionable. Shore Haven Apts.
No. III, Inc. v. De Santis, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 20, 1979, at 15, col. 3 (Civ. Ct. N.Y.). See Form
Lease, supra note 90, cl. 29.
A trial court held unconscionable a lease provision allowing a landlord, in the event of a
rent default, to re-enter the premises peacefully but without legal process. Pine Hill Assocs.
v. Malveaux, 89 Misc. 2d 234, 391 N.Y.S.2d 58 (Yonkers City Ct. 1977), rev'd mere., 93 Misc.
2d 63, 403 N.Y.S.2d 398 (App. T. 2d Dep't 1978). The appellate term reversed, holding that
the landlord had a common law right to re-enter peacefully without court process. The court
ordered a new trial to determine whether the landlord first made a demand for the rent, as
required before he can exercise his common law right. 93 Misc. 2d 63, 403 N.Y.S.2d 398 (App.
T. 2d Dep't 1978).
An Ohio court invalidated as unconscionable a lease provision requiring public housing
tenants to report the presence of overnight guests. Heritage Hills, Ltd. v. Smith, 78-CVG-
268 (Chillicothe, 0. Mun. Ct. May 8, 1978) in 12 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 192 (1978). An Oregon
court, however, applying that state's leasehold unconscionability statute, OR. Rav. STAT. §
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to declare one of the lease clauses unconscionable, he bears a heavier
burden than a residential tenant. As previously noted, although the
URLTA only applies to leases of residential space, 7" section 235-c
applies to both residential and commercial leases. 7
.Courts are not receptive to pleas of unconscionability by one mer-
chant against another.' In leases of commercial space, courts con-
sider the parties to be in more equal bargaining positions than in
leases of residential space and, thus, capable of dealing at arm's
length.'79 A commercial tenant, unlike his residential counter-part,
is generally a sophisticated businessman' 0 who usually negotiates
his lease 8' and enjoys the benefit of counsel.'82 Given these factors,
a disparity in bargaining power is rarely present in leases for com-
mercial space.'1 In addition, commercial premises are not as scarce
as residential ones. 184
For example, commercial leases often contain escalation clauses
which pass along to tenants, in the form of rent increases, any in-
creases which landlords must pay in taxes or in wages to the build-
ing employees. Courts have refused to find such clauses unconscion-
able. 8 5
91.375 (1977), upheld a $185 fee paid by the tenants in exchange for the right to terminate
the lease on thirty days' notice. Zemp v. Rowland, 31 Or. App. 1105, 572 P.2d 637 (1977).
176. See note 8 supra and accompanying text.
177. See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
178. Blake v. Biscardi, 62 A.D.2d 975, 976, 403 N.Y.S.2d 544, 546 (2d Dep't 1978)(mem.).
179. J.J. Newberry Co. v. Mixon, 440 F. Supp. 20, 21-22 (E.D. Mo. 1977)(mem.); Moores-
town Mgt., Inc. v. Moorestown Bookshop, Inc., 104 N.J. Super. 250, 259, 249 A.2d 623, 628
(1969); Twenty-One Assocs., Inc. v. Goldberg, N.Y.L.J., July 6, 1977, at 10, col. 2 (Sup. Ct.);
64 Univ. Place v. Samstein, N.Y.L.J., June 13, 1978, at 10, col. 2 (Civ. Ct. N.Y.).
180. Graziano v. Tortora Agency, Inc., 78 Misc. 2d 1094, 1096, 359 N.Y.S.2d 489, 491-92
(Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1974); Rich v. Don-Ron Trousers Corp., 74 Misc. 2d 259, 261, 343 N.Y.S.2d
684, 686 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1973).
181. J.J. Newberry Co. v. Mixon, 440 F. Supp. 20, 22 (E.D. Mo. 1977)(mem.); George
Backer Mgt. Corp. v. Acme Quilting Co., 55 A.D.2d 535, 535, 389 N.Y.S.2d 111, 112 (1st Dep't
1976)(mem.).
182. Graziano v. Tortora Agency, Inc., 78 Misc. 2d 1094, 1096, 359 N.Y.S.2d 489, 492 (Civ.
Ct. N.Y. 1974); Rich v. Don-Ron Trousers Corp., 74 Misc. 2d 259, 261, 343 N.Y.S.2d 684, 686
(Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1973).
183. See text accompanying notes 75-83 supra. However, a small-business tenant may
find himself in no better a bargaining position with a landlord than a residential tenant. See
J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, CONTRACTS § 9-39 (2d ed. 1977).
184. Twenty-One Assocs., Inc. v. Goldberg, N.Y.L.J., July 6, 1977, at 10, col. 2 (Sup. Ct.).
See text accompanying notes 69-74 supra.
185. George Backer Mgt. Corp. v. Acme Quilting Co., 55 A.D.2d 535, 535, 389 N.Y.S.2d
111, 111 (Ist Dep't 1976)(mem.), appeal dismissed, 40 N.Y.2d 1092 (1977); New York Mer-
chandise Co. v. 23rd Street Properties, 49 A.D.2d 849, 850, 373 N.Y.S.2d 867, 869 (1st
Dep't)(mem.), motion for leave to appeal denied, 38 N.Y.2d 707 (1975); Graff v. Transitube,
1979] LEASEHOLD UNCONSCIONABILITY
This is not to say that a court never will find a commercial lease
provision unconscionable. Several decisions, already discussed," '
have done just that. These decisions, however, all involved an un-
conscionable enforcement of a conscionable lease provision. Thus,
courts appear reluctant to declare unconscionable the clauses them-
selves in commercial leases.
VII. Unconscionability Claimed by Landlords
Like commercial tenants, landlords do not find the courts recep-
tive to their arguments that certain lease clauses are unconscionable
as applied to them. The factors which lead a court to hold for a
tenant-unequal bargaining power' and a depressed housing mar-
ket'88-work against a landlord who claims unconscionability.
In A WA Realty v. Storch,"'s a clause in the lease allowed the
tenant to cancel the lease upon thirty days' notice, without penalty.
A new landlord purchased the property and asked the court to hold
the clause unconscionable. Noting that the landlord had an oppor-
tunity to examine the lease before purchasing the property, the
court found a clear case of caveat emptor and refused to hold the
clause unconscionable."10
A court has held that the lack of a rent escalation clause in a long-
term lease is not unconscionable."' However, in one case, a trial was
ordered to decide if it was unconscionable for a tenant, who had
obtained a stipulation in 1950 that the rent would remain at $132.25
Inc., 90 Misc. 2d 879, 882, 396 N.Y.S.2d 313, 314 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1977); Graziano v. Tortora
Agency, Inc., 78 Misc. 2d 1094, 1096, 359 N.Y.S.2d 489, 491 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1974); Rich v. Don-
Ron Trousers Corp., 74 Misc. 2d 259, 261, 343 N.Y.S.2d 684, 688 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1973). But
see Flam v. Herrmann, 90 Misc. 2d 434, 436, 395 N.Y.S.2d 136, 137 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1977)(hear-
ing ordered to determine if escalation clause is unconscionable).
Other commercial lease provisions which have been upheld include: no rent abatement if
the property is damaged or destroyed, Rodriquez v. Nachamie, 57 A.D.2d 920, 395 N.Y.S.2d
51 (2d Dep't 1977)(mem.); electricity pass-along, 64 Univ. Place v. Samstein, N.Y.L.J., June
13, 1978, at 10, col. 2 (Civ. Ct. N.Y.); requirement that a shopping center tenant become a
member of and pay dues to an association of merchants in the center, Moorestown Mgt., Inc.
v. Moorestown Bookshop, Inc., 104 N.J. Super. 250, 249 A.2d 623 (1969); requirement that a
tentant keep its store open for business during the full term of the lease, even where the
tenant's business was no longer profitable, J.J. Newberry Co. v. Mixon, 440 F. Supp. 20 (E.D.
Mo. 1977)(mem.); acceleration of entire rent due upon default in payment of month's rent,
Fifty States Mgt. Corp. v. Pioneer Auto Parks, Inc., No. 99 (N.Y. Ct. App. Mar. 29, 1979).
186. See cases cited in notes 126, 157, 163, 167 & 171 supra.
187. See text accompanying notes 75-83 supra.
188. See text accompanying notes 69-74 supra.
189. N.Y.L.J., Dec. 6, 1978, at 16, col. 5 (Sup. Ct.).
190. Id. at 16, col. 6.
191. 200 East Tenants Corp. v. Sherry, N.Y.L.J., May 10, 1978, at 11, col. 2 (Sup. Ct.).
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a month, to sub-lease her apartment in 1976 for three years at a
monthly rental of $350. 19
Though leasehold unconscionability is primarily a remedy for ten-
ants, there may be some instances where landlords will benefit from
it also. Courts, however, will require a greater showing of uncon-
scionability from landlords than tenants.
VIII. Possible Applications of Leasehold Unconscionability
There are three areas where courts should relieve tenants of over-
reaching by landlords through the application of the doctrine of
unconscionability: (1) jury trial waivers, (2) mitigation of damages,
and (3) the use of form leases.
A. Jury Trial Waivers
The New York State Constitution guarantees a trial by jury in all
cases where that right was guaranteed before the constitution was
adopted.' 3 Since the right to a jury trial in a summary proceeding
to recover possession of real property antedated the state's constitu-
tion, it is constitutionally protected.' 9' However, the constitution
allows the parties to waive a jury trial in civil cases.' 5 By statute in
New York, the parties to a lease cannot waive a trial by jury in any
action for personal injury or property damage.'96 Most leases, how-
ever, waive jury trials in all other actions.'97
A tenant's waiver of the right to a jury trial in non-personal injury
or property damage actions taken under the lease has been held
valid and not unconscionable. 9 8 The validity of such a waiver, how-
192. Friedman v. Jordan, N.Y.L.J., June 9, 1977, at 6, col. 1 (Sup. Ct.) aff'd without
opinion, 60 A.D.2d 1008, 401 N.Y.S.2d 672 (lst Dep't 1970). On remand, the court held that
the stipulation was not a lease, hence section 235-c did not apply. N.Y.L.J., Mar. 7, 1979, at
10, col. 3 (Supp. Ct.). However, since the stipulation required that the tenant remain in
possession of the premises personally, the court held that the tenant could not sublet the
apartment for a long term. Id. The court stated in dictum that, if the stipulation was read to
convey to the tenant an unqualified life estate, the value of such an estate today would have
no reasonable nexus to the amount agreed upon in the stipulation and, thus, the stipulation
would be unconscionable under section 235-c. Id.
193. N.Y. CONST. art. 1, 2 (McKinney 1969).
194. 7 CARMODY & WAIT, CYCLOPEDIA OF NEW YORK PRACTICE § 49.26 (2d ed. 1965); N.Y.
REAL PROP. AcTs § 745 (McKinney 1963).
195. N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 2 (McKinney 1968).
196. N.Y. REAL PROP. LAw § 259-c (McKinney 1968).
197. See, e.g., Form Lease, supra note 90, cl. 29.
198. Avenue Assocs., Inc. v. Buxbaum, 83 Misc. 2d 719, 719, 373 N.Y.S.2d 814, 815 (App.
T. 1st Dep't 1975) (per curiam); Kaner v. Wood, N.Y.L.J., June 8, 1976, at 10, col. 4 (Civ.
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ever, was questioned in Avenue Associates, Inc. v. Buxbaum.'" The
trial court held a jury trial waiver unconscionable. The court stated
that, given the housing shortage, "acquiescence in a complex lease
hardly constitutes a knowing, freely contracted waiver of a constitu-
tionally protected right. . .. "10 The court held that a unilateral
waiver by the tenant made the waiver unconscionable on its face.' ° '
On appeal, the appellate term reversed, stating only that a waiver
of a jury trial in a lease is valid and binding except in an action for
personal injury or property damage.202
Courts, however, should reconsider the constitutionality of jury
trial waivers in light of United States Supreme Court decisions con-
cerning waivers of constitutional rights. In Fuentes v. Shevin, 2 3 the
Court held that a sales contract which stated the seller could take
back the merchandise in the event of default of any payments by
the buyer did not waive the buyer's due process rights to a full
hearing before the merchandise was seized. 204 The Court noted the
following factors concerning the transacton: (1) there was no bar-
gaining over the contractual terms between the parties, (2) the bar-
gaining power of the parties was unequal, (3) the waiver provision
was a printed part of a form sales contract and a necessary condition
for the sale, and (4) the seller did not prove the buyer was aware or
made aware of the significance of the waiver. In a similar case, the
Court upheld a confession of judgment clause because it was
"voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly" made.206
Ct. N.Y.); Schwartz v. Hillman, N.Y.L.J., July 28, 1976, at 8, col. 3 (Civ. Ct. N.Y.).
A few decisions voided jury trial waivers which did not comply with N.Y. Civ. PRAc. § 4544
(McKinney Supp. 1978). Section 4544 states that a residential lease provision not clear and
legible and less than eight points in depth may not be received into evidence in any trial,
hearing or proceeding. Koslowski v. Palmieri, 414 N.Y.S.2d 599 (App. T. 2d Dep't 1979);
Sorbonne Apts. Co. v. Kranz, 96 Misc. 2d 396, 398, 409 N.Y.S.2d 83, 84 (Civ. Ct. N.Y.
1978).
199. 83 Misc. 2d 134, 371 N.Y.S.2d 736 (Civ. Ct. N.Y.), rev'd per curiam, 83 Misc. 2d 719,
373 N.Y.S.2d 814 (App. T. 1st Dep't 1975).
200. 83 Misc. 2d at 141, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 744.
201. Id. at 145, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 747.
202. 83 Misc. 2d 719, 373 N.Y.S.2d 814-15 (App. T. 1st Dep't 1975)(per curiam).
203. 407 U.S. 67, rehearing denied, 409 U.S. 902 (1972).
204. 407 U.S. at 96.
205. Id. at 95. See Santiago v. McElroy, 319 F. Supp. 284, 294 (E.D. Pa. 1970)(tenants
signing form lease did not waive right to object on constitutional grounds to statutory distress
procedure).
206. D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 187 (1972). The Court here upheld
the cognovit because there was equal bargaining and no overreaching. Id. at 186. But the
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The factors which impressed the Supreme Court in Fuentes'"7
similarly should alert a court considering a jury trial waiver in a
form lease. Although Fuentes involved a waiver of a federally-
guaranteed right, the Supreme Court's reasoning is applicable to
waivers of state-guaranteed rights. Given the great disparity in bar-
gaining power between landlords and tenants, a jury trial waiver by
a tenant should be suspect as unconscionable. The courts, however,
have been strict in this area. They have held that since the tenant
knowingly signed his lease, he will be bound to the waiver contained
therein. 08 At least one court, however, ordered a hearing to deter-
mine whether the waiver was clearly, knowingly and intentionally
made by the tenant.2" Such a course is more in accord with the
Supreme Court's warning that "as the right of jury trial is funda-
mental, courts indulge every reasonable presumption against
waiver. "210
Tenants generally fare better with jury trials. Since a landlord
would rarely prefer a jury, while a tenant would rarely prefer a court,
the apparent even-handedness of the waiver is misleading. 212 There-
fore, section 235-c should be used to test the validity of the waivers.
B. Mitigation of Damages
In a majority of jurisdictions, including New York, 213 the doctrine
of mitigation of damages2 11 does not apply to a contract of leasing.2' 5
A growing number of jurisdictions, however, disagrees' and the
URLTA provides that a landlord must make reasonable efforts to
Court warned that "where the contract is one of adhesion, [and] where there is great dispar-
ity in bargaining power, . . . other legal consequences may insue." Id. at 188.
207. See text accompanying note 205 supra.
208. Schwartz v. Hillman, N.Y.L.J., July 28, 1976, at 9, col. 3 (Civ. Ct. N.Y.); Kaner v.
Ward, N.Y.L.J., June 8, 1976, at 10, col. 4 (Civ. Ct. N.Y.). See also David v. Manufacturers
Hanover Trust Co., 59 Misc. 2d 248, 249, 298 N.Y.S.2d 847, 848 (App. T. 2d Dep't 1969)(per
curiam).
209. 407-88 Assocs. v. Sawyer, 83 Misc. 2d 300, 301, 371 N.Y.S.2d 748, 750 (Civ. Ct. N.Y.
1975).
210. Aetna Insur. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393 (1937).
211. Bentley, supra note 63, at 855-56.
212. Berger, supra note 13, at 829.
213. Becar v. Flues, 64 N.Y. 518, 520 (1876); Mack Kanner & Sons, Inc. v. Abramowitz,
17 Misc. 2d 229, 230, 183 N.Y.S.2d 593, 595 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
214. See J. CALAMARI & J. PEaRLLO, CONrACTS § 14-15 (2d ed. 1977).
215. See Annot., 21 A.L.R.3d 534, 546-56 (1968).
216. Id. at 565-70. See Bradbrook, The Application of the Principle of Mitigation of
Damages to Landlord-Tenant Law, 8 SYDNEY L. REv. 15 (1977).
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rerent the premises at a fair rental.' Recognizing a duty to mitigate
damages under a lease is more in keeping with the modern concep-
tion of a lease as a contract."'
Leases often include a provision that the landlord is under no
duty to mitigate damages. ' In Lefrak v. Lambert,2 0 the trial court
held such a clause unconscionable. The court stated:2 2'
There is something basically unjust, basically unreasonable and, therefore,
basically not legal about a landlord in an urban society with a housing shor-
tage having no obligation to try to rerent an apartment and mitigate dam-
ages. There is something unfair about permitting tenants to be in a different
category than other persons entering into a contract.
The court then held that the New York common law rule that
landlords have no duty to mitigate should be reversed.222 The court
found, as a matter of law, that seventeen months was an unreasona-
ble time for the apartment to remain vacant, absent proof that the
landlord made a good faith effort to rerent.22 3 The trial court limited
the landlord's damages to three months rent.224 On appeal, the ap-
pellate term modified the lower court's damage award and allowed
the landlord to recover damages for the entire time the apartment
remained vacant.225 Since the evidence established reasonable and
diligent efforts by the landlord to rerent, the appellate court ruled
it was not necessary to decide whether a landlord must mitigate
damages when a tenant vacates.2 28
There have been other judicial attempts in New York to change
the rule concerning a landlord's duty to mitigate damages.2 27 One
court held that a landlord's refusal to rerent premises for nine
217. URLTA § 4.203(c).
218. See notes 45-52 supra and accompanying text.
219. See, e.g., Form Lease, supra note 90, cls. 18(B) & 20.
220. 89 Misc. 2d 197, 390 N.Y.S.2d 959 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1976), aff'd as modified per curiam,
93 Misc. 2d 632, 403 N.Y.S.2d 397 (App. T. 2d Dep't 1978).
221. 89 Misc. 2d at 205, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 965.
222. Id. at 203, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 964.
223. Id. at 200-01, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 961.
224. Id. at 205, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 965.
225. 93 Misc. 2d 632, 633, 403 N.Y.S.2d 397, 398 (App. T. 2d Dep't 1978).
226. Id.
227. Gracie Towne House, Inc. v. Weinstein, N.Y.L.J., March 14, 1973, at 17, col. 4 (App.
T. 1st Dep't)(per curiam); Douglas Manor House, Inc. v. Wohlfield, 66 Misc. 2d 265, 266-67,
322 N.Y.S.2d 135, 137-38 (App. T. 1st Dep't 1970) (dissenting opinion); Parkwood Realty Co.
v. Marcaho, 77 Misc. 2d 690, 692, 353 N.Y.S.2d 623, 625-26 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1974); New York
Univ. v. Nieto, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 13, 1973, at 18, col. 4 (Civ. Ct. N.Y.). See Posner & Gallet,
Mitigation of Damages in Residential-Lease Breaches, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 5, 1978, at 1, col. 2.
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months is unconscionable conduct.22 Another, while finding no duty
to mitigate under a commercial lease, implied a possible duty under
a residential one.229 Although this trend towards modernizing the
mitigation of damages rule has been noted,230 neither the appellate
courts2 13' nor the legislature1 2 has overturned the traditional New
York rule.
As long as New York refuses to impose on the landlord a duty to
mitigate damages, a lease clause stating that the landlord is under
no obligation to rerent cannot be held unconscionable. However,
any unreasonable conduct in not mitigating could be held uncons-
cionable under the court's equity powers since good faith dealings
between landlords and tenants are now read into leases.233
C. The Form Lease
Most residential landlords use a standard form lease.23' Several
courts have commented on the use of such leases.2 35 As one court
stated :239
From the most cursory examination of any of these residential lease forms,
it is immediately apparent that they have been carefully, painstakingly de-
signed to provide maximum protection for the landlords and to give only the
most grudging minimal recognition to the reasonable expectations of residen-
tial tenants. Not one of these widely used forms comes close to representing
a fair bargain. And yet it is a simple statement of facts that most people
228. Sherman Taylor Corp. v. Cohen, N.Y.L.J., July 10, 1973, at 11, col. 1 (Civ. Ct. N.Y.).
229. Twenty-One Assocs. v. Goldberg, N.Y.L.J., July 6, 1977, at 10, col. 1 (Sup. Ct.).
230. Birchwood Assocs. v. Stem, 88 Misc. 2d 937, 938, 390 N.Y.S.2d 505, 506 (App. T. 2d
Dep't 1976)(per curiam).
231. The appellate courts have avoided the issue. See id.; Helmsley v. Anderson Clayton
& Co., 60 A.D.2d 808, 808, 400 N.Y.S.2d 544, 545 (mem.), modified, 61 A.D.2d 957 (1st
Dep't)(mem.), motion for leave to appeal denied, 44 N.Y.2d 641 (1978); Howard Stores Corp.
v. Robison Rayon Co., 36 A.D.2d 911, 911, 320 N.Y.S.2d 861, 862 (1st Dep't 1971)(mene.);
Lefrak v. Lambert, 93 Misc. 2d 632, 633, 403 N.Y.S.2d 397, 398 (App. T. 2d Dep't 1978).
232. In 1976 and 1977, the New York State Assembly passed bills which would have made
the landlord's duty to mitigate a statutory one. The bills were not passed by the state senate.
Posner & Gallet, Mitigation of Damages in Residential-Lease Breaches, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 5,
1978, at 6, col. 3.
233. 57 E. 54 Realty Corp. v. Gay Nineties Realty Corp., 71 Misc. 2d 353, 354, 335
N.Y.S.2d 872, 873 (App. T. 1st Dep't 1972). See URLTA § 1.302.
234. See note 63 supra.
235. Santiago v. McElroy, 319 F. Supp. 284, 294 (E.D. Pa. 1970); Morbeth Realty Corp.
v. Velez, 73 Misc. 2d 996, 1000, 343 N.Y.S.2d 406, 411 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1973); Galligan v.
Arovitch, 421 Pa. 301, 304, 319 A.2d 463, 465 (1966).
236. Steinberg v. Carreras, 74 Misc. 2d 32, 35, 344 N.Y.S.2d 136, 141-42 (Civ. Ct. N.Y.
1973), rev'd per curiam, 77 Misc. 2d 774, 357 N.Y.S.2d 369 (App. T. 1st Dep't 1974).
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cannot rent apartments in this city [New York]-cannot in fact live
here-unless they sign one of these printed-form leases.
Section 235-c allows a court to declare an entire lease unconscion-
able. 3 ' While no court has taken such action, at least one considered
the possibility. 38 U.C.C. section 2-302 similarly allows for an entire
contract to be held unconscionable 3 and such action has been
taken under that section. 40
Standard leases are generally long, complicated documents.24" '
They are "simply grotesque in their one-sidedness,"' seldom re-
vised, and fail to include duties imposed on the landlord by law. 43
One could question, therefore, whether a form lease is a contract at
all since it cannot be regarded as the manifest consent of the tenant.
A contract may be oppressive taken as a whole, although no single
term in itself is unconscionable.245 The fact' that form leases are
adhesion contracts offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis in a tight
housing market24 makes suspect their conscionability. In addition,
since they normally contain clauses which have been held uncons-
cionable247 and clauses which border on the unconscionable, 48 form
leases in toto could be declared unconscionable. 49
.237. N.Y. REAL PROP. LAw § 235-c(1) (McKinney Supp. 1978).
238. Sorbonne Apts. Co. v. Kranz, 96 Misc. 2d 396, 397, 409 N.Y.S.2d 83, 84 (Civ. Ct.
N.Y. 1978).
239. U.C.C. § 2-302, Comment 2.
240. State v. ITM, Inc., 52 Misc. 2d 39, 54, 275 N.Y.S.2d 303, 321 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
241. New York's "Plain English Law" requires that leases for residential space be written
in a clear and coherent manner using words with common and everyday meaning. N.Y. GEN.
OBLIG. LAW § 5-702 (McKinney Supp. 1978). Because of this law, the Real Estate Board of
New York revised its standard lease form. N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 1979, at A15, col. 4.
242. Morbeth Realty Corp. v. Velez, 73 Misc. 2d 996, 1000, 343 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Civ. Ct.
N.Y. 1973).
243. Bentley, supra note 63, at 837, 850.
244. See Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking
Power, 84 HARv. L. Rzv. 529, 544 (1971).
245. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 234 (Tent. Draft Nos. 1-7, 1972).
246. See text accompanying notes 60-83 supra.
247. See notes 90, 102, & 115 supra.
248. See notes 197 & 219 supra.
249. As a replacement for the landlord's form lease, states could mandate use of a statu-
tory lease in all residential rentals. Such a bill was introduced into the New York Assembly
in 1973 but it was not enacted. Assembly Bill 1513 (Jan. 16, 1973). For a discussion in favor
of a statutory lease, see Kirby, supra note 63, at 235-37. For a discusson against a statutory
'lease, see Bentley, supra note 63, at 879-80.
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IX. Construing Section 235-c
In the almost three years since section 235-c was enacted into law,
the New York courts have had to consider several issues in applying
the statute, including: (1) whether the statute applies to oral leases,
(2) whether the clause must be unconscionable when made, and (3)
whether the statute requires a hearing on the issue of unconsciona-
bility.
A. Oral Leases
In Valley Forge Village v. Anthony, 250 tenants in a mobile home
park sought to have their rent increases held unconsionable. The
tenants had no written leases but leased the property under oral
month-to-month tenancies. The court held that section 235-c does
not apply to month-to-month tenancies.25' The court, however, did
not rule that the statute is inapplicable to oral leases, as has been
suggested by one commentator.252
Valley Forge ruled that a lease, whether written or oral, is a prere-
quisite for the application of section 235-c 253 since the statute speaks
of "a lease or any clause of the lease ' ' 254 and since the statute is an
addendum to another statute which similarly refers to a lease. 5
Because a month-to-month tenancy in New York is not treated as
a leashold relationship, such a tenancy is not a class of oral lease
but a unique estate in property. 26 To be distinguished is the leasing
of property for a single month, which is a situation where section
235-c would apply.
Thus, there can be no doubt that before a court can apply section
235-c, some type of lease must exist. Similarly, the U.C.C. uncon-
scionability provison requires some type of contract. This does not
mean oral leases or contracts are immune from the application of
250. 92 Misc. 2d 1007, 401 N.Y.S.2d 978 (Suffolk Dist; Ct.) aff'd per curiam, 96 Misc. 2d
62, 409 N.Y.S.2d 957 (App. T. 2d Dep't 1978).
251. 92 Misc. 2d at 1009, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 980.
252. See Muldoon, Unconscionable Lease Provisions, 410 N.Y.S.2d No. 5, at 37 (Jan. 17,
1979).
253. 92 Misc. 2d at 1009, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 980. New York law requires that a lease of real
property for a period longer than one year be in writing. N.Y. GEN. OBuG. LAw § 5-703(2)
(McKinney 1978).
254. N.Y. REAL PROP. LAw § 235-c(1) (McKinney Supp. 1978).
255. Id. § 235 (McKinney 1978).
256. 92 Misc. 2d at 1009, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 980.
257. Id. at 1010, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 980.
[Vol. VII
LEASEHOLD UNCONSCIONABILITY
these statutes. Where a valid oral lease or contract exists, a court
may hold it or any of its clauses unconscionable.
B. Lease Unconscionable "When Made"
Section 235-c requires a court to find a lease unconscionable "at
the time it was made.""25 Section 2-302 of the U.C.C. contains a
similar requirement. The wording of the statute indicates that the
lease or clause therein itself must be held unconscionable, not
merely the result of the enforcement of the lease or clause.25 In
addition, it must have been unconscionable when it was made, not
when it was breached or enforced.6 0
Thus, a court refused to grant a landlord's request to declare a
lease unconscionable due to the lack of a rent escalation clause
because when the lease was made, there was nothing unconsciona-
ble about the ommission of the clause.2"' Similarly, section 235-c
was held not to apply to a rent increase because the increase did not
exist at the time of the making of the lease.6 2 As a corolary to this,
a court may not add a clause to a lease under section 235-c.6 3
C. Necessity for a Hearing
When one of the parties under a lease claims that the lease is
unconscionable, the question remains whether the court must order
a hearing before it can pass on the issue of unconscionability. Sec-
tion 235-c requires that, when a party makes such a claim, the
parties be afforded "a reasonable opportunity to present evi-
dence."6
Since the U.C.C. provision is similar, it is helpful to consider how
the courts have construed its wording. Under the U.C.C., a hearing
is mandatory once the court has accepted a possibility of uncon-
258. N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 235-c(1) (McKinney Supp. 1978).
259. See text accompanying notes 172-74 supra.
260. See also cases construing U.C.C. § 2-302 on this point: Jamestown Farmers Elev.,
Inc. v. General Mills, Inc., 413 F. Supp. 764, 772 (D.N.D. 1976), rev'd on other grounds, 552
F.2d 1285 (8th Cir. 1977); Fairfield Lease Corp. v. Umberto, 7 U.C.C. Rep. 1181, 1184 (Civ.
Ct. N.Y. 1970).
261. 200 East Tenants Corp. v. Sherry, N.Y.L.J., May 10, 1978, at 11, col. 2 (Sup. Ct.).
262. Valley Forge Village v. Anthony, 92 Misc. 2d 1007, 1010, 401 N.Y.S.2d 978, 980
(Suffolk Dist. Ct. 1978)(mem.).
263. Beechwood Avenue Corp. v. Reborg Corp., N.Y.L.J., Nov. 28, 1977, at 13, col. 4 (App.
T. 2d Dep't).
264. N.Y. REAL PRop. LAW § 235-c(2) (McKinney Supp. 1978).
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scionability 2 5 Thus, where the court saw the possibility of an un-
conscionable contract, a hearing was ordered.6 ' Where no such pos-
sibility was seen, the necessity for a hearing was obviated.267
The courts which have considered this question under section
235-c are split on whether a hearing is mandatory or discretionary.
Two courts ruled that a hearing was mandatory,268 although one
stated that the lease clause at issue did not appear to be uncon-
scionable.2 9 One court, however, refused to order a hearing since
no basis existed for finding the clause involved unconscionable. 2 1
Given the courts' practice under the U.C.C. of mandating.a hearing
on the issue of unconscionability only when such a possibility
appears to exists, 7' the court in the last case followed the correct
procedure. If such a procedure were not followed, courts would be
flooded with superfluous demands for hearings on unconscion-
ability. 172
X. Conclusion
Leasehold unconscionability is a major addition to the battle
against overreaching landlords. It is indicative, in a legal sense, of
the contractual nature of the landlord-tenant relationship and, in a
socio-political sense, of an awareness by courts and legislatures that
tenants need to be protected from the capricious acts of landlords.
Now that courts are voiding leases or lease provisions as uncons-
cionable, whether by statute or equity principles, tenants can es-
265. ANDERSON'S UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302:21 (2d ed. 1970).
266. Zicari v. Joseph Harris Co., 33 A.D.2d 17, 24, 304 N.Y.S.2d 918, 925 (4th Dep't 1969),
motion for leave to appeal denied, 26 N.Y.2d 610 (1970); Central Ohio Co-Operative Milk
Producers, Inc. v. Rowland, 29 Ohio App. 2d 236, 240, 281 N.E.2d 42, 44 (1972).
267. Architectural Aluminum Corp. v. Macarr, Inc., 70 Misc. 2d 495, 499-500, 333
N.Y.S.2d 818, 823-24 (Sup. Ct. 1972); Sinkoff Beverage Co. v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co.,
51 Misc. 2d 446, 448, 273 N.Y.S.2d 364, 367 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
268. Flam v. Herrmann, 90 Misc. 2d 434, 436, 395 N.Y.S.2d 136, 137 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1977);
Edgemont Assocs. v. Skolnick, 90 Misc. 2d 761, 764, 396 N.Y.S.2d 130, 132 (Town of Green-
burgh Justice Ct. 1977).
269. Edgemont Assocs. v. Skolnick, 90 Misc. 2d 761, 763, 396 N.Y.S.2d 130, 132 (Town
of Greenburgh Justice Ct. 1977).
270. Graff v. Transitube, Inc., 90 Misc. 2d 879, 882, 396 N.Y.S.2d 313, 314 (Civ. Ct. N.Y.
1977).
271. See note 265 supra and accompanying text.
272. Some opponents of section 235-c argued that, since the statute mandated a hearing
whenever a claim of unconscionability was made, the courts would be over-burdened. See
New York State Bar Association Legislation Report No. 70, at 2 (1976). However, U.C.C.
section 2-302 has not caused a significant increase in litigation. See Terry & Fauvre, The
Unconscionability Offense, 4 GA. L. REV. 469, 496 (1970).
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cape from a burdensome lease or unreasonable conduct by the land-
lord. The form lease-the most powerful weapon in the landlord's
mighty arsenal-can be dismantled or even abolished by the appli-
cation of the doctrine of leasehold unconscionability.
The doctrine, of course, is not perfect,1 3 depending, as it does, on
the varied moral judgments of the courts. What shocks the consci-
ence of one court may not so offend another court."4 Nevertheless,
statutes such as section 235-c and URLTA 1.303 are giant steps
forward in transforming the law from caveat lessee to caveat lessor.
Tenants now can expect courts, particularly in New York,"7 5 to apply
these statutes and the equitable doctrine of unconscionability
against overreaching landlords and leases.
Kevin J. Farrelly
273. For discussions of the problems with the theory of unconscionability, see Bradbrook,
The Law Relating to the Residential Landlord-Tenant Relationship: An Initial Study of the
Need for Reform, 9 MELBOURNE U. L. REv. 589, 594 (1974); Kirby, supra note 63, at 221-24.
274. Compare Harwood v. Lincoln Square Apts. Sec. 5, Inc., 78 Misc. 2d 1097, 359
N.Y.S.2d 387 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1974) with Hausman v. Residential Funding Corp., 76 Misc. 2d
522, 351 N.Y.S.2d 265 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1973). See note 122 supra.
275. As of 1971, more cases were decided under U.C.C. § 2-302 in New York than in all
the other Code jurisdictions combined. West, Unconscionability: A State by State Survey, 5
CLEARINGHOUSE REVIEw 61, 79 (1971).
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